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Abstract

An interdisciplinary approach to the epistemic value of moral ambiguity
by
Jordan Wylie
Co-chairs: Ana Gantman and Justin Storbeck

Morality is a critical aspect of life––it influences how we think, design political and legal
systems, who we connect with, our norms, and the types of stories we tell. Yet, even with the
well documented influence of morality on many aspects of life, exactly what makes moral
themes so fascinating remains elusive. This dissertation aims to introduce Moral Worldbuilding
as a theory for understanding our epistemic drives toward morally ambiguous and morally bad
content.
In Chapter I, we introduce the problem of moral badness, which is not well handled by
extant moral literature. To combat this, we offer a new framework called Moral Worldbuilding.
Moral worldbuilding, like other coherence-based theories, posits that moral cognition is largely
in the service of epistemic goals, helping people define the contours of their moral worlds. This
framework helps to explain what are otherwise seen as peculiar features of our morality like why
people often feel good when doing bad and critically, why we are so drawn to moral ambiguity
and moral badness. To this end, we explore why potentially immoral things (e.g., true crime) are
nonetheless cognitively engaging, drawing in curiosity and explanation-seeking drives.
In Chapter II, we leverage the diverse body of literature introduced in Chapter I to
investigate what makes morality so special and test the foundations of Moral Worldbuilding. A
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pilot experiment, and Experiments 1a and 1b establish the plausibility of this framework by
showing that people are more curious to learn moral about ambiguity and moral badness than
moral goodness and moral averageness. We find that moral ambiguity and badness specifically
prompt explanation-seeking motives. We also explore how individual differences in what the
moral world looks like contribute to moral curiosity.
In Chapter III and Chapter IV, we show that norms influence moral curiosity and that
curiosity for moral ambiguity is unique. In Experiment 2, we show that moral ambiguity and
moral averageness differ, and that moral curiosity predicts perceived but not actual learning. In
Experiment 3, we demonstrate that moral ambiguity is a unique source of epistemic motivation.
We compare moral ambiguity to aesthetic ambiguity and explore the individual differences that
moderate interest in moral ambiguity.
In Chapter V, we synthesize the findings presented in Chapters II-IV and discuss their
implications for moral theory. We demonstrate that the Moral Worldbuilding framework and
findings presented in this dissertation make novel predictions about information-seeking, and
moral cognition more broadly. We also discuss limitations of this work. While we demonstrated
that moral curiosity is most consistently directed toward ambiguous and bad moral content,
several questions remain, including whether there exists a boundary condition for interest in
badness. Together, this work provides a unique interdisciplinary approach to improve the study
of morality.
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Preface

“I don’t know whether there are any moral saints. But if there are, I am glad that neither I nor
those about whom I care most are among them.”
— Susan Wolf (1982)

Susan Wolf crafted her brilliant piece on moral saints long before I started thinking about the
boring nature of superheroes. Her work inspired me to think deeply about the mirror to moral
saints—moral villains, which would eventually inspire this dissertation. I am thankful to her.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 The problem
Humans are deeply moral animals. Themes related to moral concepts have emerged across
disparate cultures throughout all of human history. These frequent yet diverse themes point to a
powerful role for morality in shaping many of the foundational elements of society: the rules of
cooperation, punishment, reciprocity, and more are all scaffolded by morality. For instance,
morality has the power to create a reality where there are substantial costs for selfish decisionmaking (as embodied by our reciprocity norms), and it also affords cooperation between large
heterogenous groups of people (Tomasello, 2014). That is, morality serves important functions
on the cultural level by etching cultural and social norms of a society into stone, allowing
individuals to maximize fitness (in an evolutionary sense) by coordinating and cooperating in
large-scale societies (Gintis et al., 2008; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). Further, morality also plays
a large role within individuals and across development. For example, evidence suggests that even
young children are sensitive to basic moral violations of others (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2011; Vaish
et al., 2010; Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin, 2018), and are willing to forgo personal desires in
the service of punishing a third-party (Marshall et al., 2021; Vaish et al., 2011). For adults, moral
traits play a large role in defining our identity and sense of self (Heiphetz et al., 2017;
Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Morality shapes everything from the rules societies makes to the
punishment behaviors of young children—its dictates are often salient, powerful, and socially
desirable. And yet, even with all this focus on what it means to be morally good, our human
preferences remain more complicated than they might appear.
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Nonetheless, it is clear that morality is in some ways a predictable determinant of behavior
and feelings. We feel guilt when we transgress and proud when we do the right thing. We
condemn the acts of society’s misfits—murderers, rapists, pedophiles—and we laud those who
uphold our standards—people who have been brave or benevolent. But this black vs. white,
villains vs. hero conception of morality fails to capture its complexity. Despite the centrality of
goodness in human life, there’s still something unusual about being “too good”. That is, being
relentlessly morally good is plainly boring. As quoted in the prelude to this dissertation, this
conflict between what we think morality should do on an individual level and what it actually
does was famously noted by Philosopher Susan Wolf in her seminal piece on moral saints. Wolf
argued that people have an aversion to faultlessly morally good others, and rightfully so (Wolf,
1982). But why moral goodness is unappetizing when our lives and cultures are so surrounded by
important moral rules remains unclear.
On the one hand, this conflict between the seeming dominance of moral goodness in life
and society and a distaste for those that are good is unexpected. Moral goodness is foundational
to individuals’ identity and character—our moral selves are our truest selves (Strohminger &
Nichols, 2014) and being morally good is seen as natural (Lebowitz et al., 2019; 2022). Even our
memories of past actions are consistently viewed through rose colored glasses—we
misremember our moral transgressions in favor of remembering ourselves as being morally good
(Stanley & De Brigard, 2019). We often display a need to feel that we are good people, and we
look for moral traits when getting to know others (Brambilla et al., 2011). All of this evidence
suggests that morally good traits should play an outsized role in our lives and are very likely the
moral traits we prefer in ourselves and others.
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On the other hand, Wolf’s assertation and this conflict is also unsurprising. Moral saints
are, by definition, rare. As such, what constitutes their character is opaque and even inaccessible
to the average person. While moral goodness plays an ostensibly central role in our lives, it may
not provide interesting or engaging insight into our daily lives simply because individuals don’t
often live lives of sainthood. And when we look to our revealed preferences (Samuelson, 1948;
Houthakker, 1950) in the real-world, they support this notion—moral badness and moral
ambiguity are often the qualities that capture interest. For example, in the summer of 2008, the
movie The Dark Knight hit theaters, selling over 62 million tickets in the United States alone.
The Dark Knight grossed over $1.005 billion dollars in box office sales, placing it as one of the
highest-grossing movie openings in history (Rotten Tomatoes, n.d.). The appeal of stories like
The Dark Knight, and the many popular antiheroic stories that followed (Douglas, 2020;
Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2015), stem from their representation of morality. Rather than create
a world centered on bad-or-good, black-or-white characters, these stories craft their worlds
around the ambiguity in the moral values, goals, and actions of the main characters.
Simply, people find Christopher Nolan’s Batman and The Joker fascinating. The narrative
of Batman is one of ambiguity, complexity, and inner conflict—Batman is not someone who’s
moral compass effortlessly points toward good. Instead, viewers watch him struggle to do what
is right. The story of Batman centers moral ambiguity and, in the case of The Dark Knight,
introduces moral badness and chaos as its foil 1. Like other similar narratives, the appeal of this
kind of narrative reveals something interesting about our moral preferences—just like the case of
the unpopular moral saint—moral complexity and even badness in entertainment are usually
most interesting. Indeed, in one large-scale study used a dataset from a company with over

There’s also a movie in which Batman is pitted against the morally pure Superman—here, the powerful and
perfectly morally good Superman serves as the foil to the complicated vigilante.
1
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232,000 registered users and explored the characters that users were most interested in learning
more about. As the authors predicted, the dominant preference was for villains over heroes
(Krause & Rucker, 2020). The peculiar tension between morally good and curiosity for morally
ambiguous or bad people is the focus of the present analysis. In the following sections, we
examine the focus of current moral theories and how they fail to adequately characterize the
allure of morally bad things, explore the concept of moral worldbuilding as a way to better
understand our human need to explore relevant information, examine how epistemic motive
theory can help us understand these motives, and bridge literatures to reveal why we are drawn
to the kinds of minds we find engaging and exploring why we prefer some moral minds over
others.
1.2 Is morality for maximizing moral good?
The pursuit of moral goodness is a central tenet of humanity—the rules that proscribe it
emerge across time, cultures, and all religious texts. Morality dominates person perception and
formation of self-concept (Luttrell et al., 2022; Landy et al., 2016; Brambilla et al., 2011;
Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; Strohminger, 2019), even in children (Heiphetz et al., 2018). It is
a critical piece to our lives, and that centrality is echoed in the attention that psychologists have
given the topic. There has been a sustained interest in moral psychology for more than a decade
(“Moral Psychology”, Google Trends, n.d.), and while these papers share a common keyword
and often share common themes, the notion of morality continues to be notoriously difficult to
define. Morality has that famous “you-know-it-when-you-see-it” quality that characterizes both
jazz and pornography; yet, even with its difficult to articulate nature, moral theorists have
nevertheless sought to unify the vast moral landscape.
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Moral psychological theory has focused extensively on identifying what people and
cultures deem to be morally valuable, and how we deride and want to punish those who commit
immoral actions (e.g., Graham et al., 2011; Atari et al., 2022). The bulk of these attempts have
cohered around three generative debates: One is about defining the kind of content that counts as
immoral and whether there is really just one or many (e.g., harm vs. moral foundations; Gray,
Waytz, et al., 2012; Schein & Gray, 2018; Graham et al., 2011). Another is a process debate
about whether or not emotion is causal or essential in the formation of moral judgments (Prinz,
2006; Eskine et al., 2011; May, 2018; Landy & Goodwin, 2015). The third is about which ethical
principles best describe the moral judgment process (e.g., consequentialism vs. deontology;
Greene et al., 2008; Conway & Gawronski, 2013). These approaches are both frequent and
powerful because they are face valid. They seek to explain moral phenomena by appealing to
what individuals might all reasonably count as moral at a given time (e.g., justice; harm). For
example, in Western culture, the principle of “do no harm” is important to many aspects of life.
It shows up in various forms in religious texts, early education, and even medical training
(nonmaleficence obligation). It’s no wonder theories that aim to define morality as dealing with
harms are compelling for researchers raised in the West (or from WEIRD countries). However,
each of these theoretical perspectives, regardless of their approach, share the fundamental
assumption that people should, and often do, seek to maximize moral good. And in doing so,
these theories have revealed other assumptions that make it difficult to parse the patterns of
interest in moral badness.
1.2.1 Assumption 1: The low dimensionality of badness
The first key assumption that these theories often make is that moral badness, however
defined, is bad per se. On this treatment, moral wrongs are necessarily aversive, and they should
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motivate us to be good and avoid bad. That is, if we are the hedonists that moral psychologists
often believe us to be, then moral wrongness and fears of bad moral character should propel us
away from certain actions, people, and situations. However, this is also not as clear as it may
seem (except maybe with children; see Starmans & Bloom, 2016). There are times when
morality doesn’t seem to matter to us, and times when moral badness feels good and is
interesting. For example, research suggests that people enjoy simulating the immoral actions of
others when we imagine that they are morally justified (Morris et al., 2022). Other research
suggest people do not actually prefer being more morally good themselves (Sun & Goodwin,
2020), they don’t always care about those traits in others (Melnikoff & Bailey, 2020), and even
prefer dishonest friends to honest ones (Berry et al., 2022). What’s more, research on moral
licensing suggests that individuals merely want to give the appearance that they are morally
good–they aren’t actually motivated to do the work of being good (Monin & Miller, 2001; see
Merritt et al., 2010 for review). Instead, people want to be just good enough (Zlatev et al., 2020).
Rather than avoiding bad people or prioritizing minimizing badness in oneself or in others,
morality helps us maintain the belief that one is morally good–which is rooted in the belief that
one’s true self is morally good (De Freitas, Cikara, et al., 2018; De Freitas, Sarkissian, et al.,
2018; Monin & Jordan, 2009).
This same pattern can be seen when trying to understand morality as about intentions or
total harms. If all we care about is reducing the amount of harm, badness, or wrongness, then we
would expect our moral judgments to be linearly sensitive to outcomes. But this is not the case.
For example, research suggests that hypocrites––individuals for whom their stated moral
positions depart from their actualized moral behaviors––are strongly disliked, unless there is
evidence that this departure was by accident (Jordan et al., 2017). Further, research shows that
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we dislike other people's intentional wrongs (e.g., Young & Saxe, 2011), but we feel more guilt
after committing our own accidental wrongs (Knobe), and that intentional wrongs are seen as
more morally bad than wrongs from which intentions were good or nonexistent (Knobe, 2003).
Research also suggests that moral wrongness and badness do not always literally follow a linear
trend. For example, research comparing harm to purity moral violations suggests that harm
judgments get worse the greater the harm (mirroring this assumption), but that purity violations
depart from this. For purity violations, a threshold exists over which the quantity of badness or
wrongness is no longer relevant (Rottman & Young, 2019). Together, these findings point to the
disconnect between moral wrongness minimization assumptions and empirically tested moral
behavior. That is, it is often that findings like these within the field of morality require mental
gymnastics to make sense of them from the lens of larger frameworks. It is not clear how harm
or wrongness minimization (or not) functions and reputation and communication functions
morality fit together.
The last thing to note about this assumption is that this view of bad as aversive dominates
because this is often precisely how we think of ourselves. We think that we should work on bad
things in the same way that we should avoid pain and suffering. But this is not always the case;
bad relationship partners, obsessions with true crime, and films centering on psychopathology
(e.g., The Joker) each point to a drive to seek out moral badness (and also a fascination with fear;
e.g., Bloom, 2020; Andersen et al., 2020; Andrade & Cohen, 2007). And this handling of
badness is present in philosophy and popular media though overlooked in psychology. There are
times when it feels desirable to do bad, even just for its sake (Sussman, 2009), and these drives
play out in many parts of life (e.g., Bloom, 2021a; Bloom, 2021b). Some empirical evidence also
supports this view of being drawn to morally bankrupt behavior, suggesting that people enjoy the
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“highs” of cheating (Ruedy et al., 2013). Further, the obsession with both bad people and
character flaws that can be seen in cinema, on television, and in books reveals interesting
insights into how morality is dealt with in real life. Taken together, negative valence is not
always directly connected to the experience of morally badness. Instead, being bad can, and
often does, make us feel good.
1.2.2 Assumption 2: Some content is inherently moral
Another assumption that is made by prominent theoretical approaches is that certain
content is necessarily in the moral domain. This assumption is particularly pervasive in the study
of moral psychology, and it directly contributes to a great deal of pendulum swinging—swinging
from arguments about monist versus pluralist approaches to morality and back again. However,
it is unlikely that any content is inherently moral. Such views often appear in more descriptively
focused theories of morality (e.g., Moral Foundation Theory) whereby the duties (i.e., content)
that are central to a culture or group represent the spaces where moral wrongs can occur and
should be avoided (Graham et al., 2011). That is, one cannot see moral wrongness where moralness does not occur, and so many theories have focused on the types of content that push things
into the moral bucket. But what is moral in one moment or in one generation may not be moral in
the next (see also Rozin, 1999). Indeed, even on issues that are of seemingly current moral value
like gun ownership or PrEP use in the United States, research suggests that individuals vary in
the degree to which they find the issue to be morally relevant, which ultimately predicts lack of
support for relevant policy (Wylie et al., in press). Individual belief systems, which are of course
couched in cultural contexts, contribute to what individuals believe is morally relevant and what
isn’t (e.g., Brandt, 2022; Brandt & Morgan, 2022).
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Another approach is to compare the role of emotions and reason in moral judgment and
decision-making (Greene et al., 2001; Cushman et al., 2006). Oftentimes, the comparisons
between sentimentalism and rationalism suggest a duality in the moral decision-making process,
and they attempt to demonstrate the contexts under which one wins out over the other (e.g.,
Cushman time pressure; Greene et al., 2008). On the side of the sentimentalists, classic
arguments include arguments for the centrality of emotion in moral judgment (Rozin et al., 1999;
Prinz, 2006; Haidt, 2001; Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Nichols, 2004; but see Hueber et al.,
2009; Landy & Goodwin, 2015), the necessity of emotion to moral judgment (Zhong, 2011; Gu
et al., 2013), and the causal influence of emotion to moral judgment (Seidel & Prinz, 2013;
Schnall et al., 2008; Horberg et al., 2011; Nichols, 2002). These are contrasted with rationalist
approaches, which suggest that harmfulness judgments are necessarily rational (Greene et al.,
2008; Gray et al., 2014), moral judgments are sensitive to harmfulness calculations (Gray &
Schein, 2016; Rottman & Young, 2019; Schein & Gray, 2016; but see Rozyman et al., 2015;
Royzman & Borislow, 2022), and that moral judgments rely on inferences based on acquired
knowledge (Kohlberg, 1969). These approaches, alongside other approaches which attempt to
resolve this debate by expanding the meaning of intuition (May, 2018), require definitional
agreement (e.g., what counts as an emotion vs. a cognition) to settle, and have the upshot only of
explaining a mechanism by which moral judgments come to bear, not how or for what more
general purpose moral content became just that in the first place.
Additionally, theories that center around harm (which is a form of content) also make the
assumption that some content is necessarily moral. For example, the dyadic theory, extends more
general mind perception models (Gray et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2011; Waytz, Cacioppo, et al.,
2010) to moral agents and patients. On this view, perception of agency (in a moral agent) and of
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experiencing (in a feeling patient) are how we understand when a transgression becomes a matter
of moral relevance (e.g., Gray, Young, et al., 2012; Gray, Waytz, et al., 2012; Waytz, Gray, et
al., 2010). This theory is a kind of prototype theory where a common cognitive template
scaffolds moral perception by allowing the flexible application of general mind perception to
potentially matching moral situations. This renders the identification of both a patient and an
agent in a situation a necessary condition for moral judgments to occur (Gray, Young, et al.,
2012; Gray et al., 2014). However, dyadic theory assumes that harm is necessary (and often
sufficient) for morality to emerge (but see Gray et al., 2022). A situation that lacks an agent or a
patient and (perceived) harm just isn’t moral. This central focus on harm also brings with it an
assumption that morality is about badness and wrongness—the valence of moral quandaries is
taken as obvious. But this might not always be the case. This theory has spurred a great deal of
research that focuses on noticing and making judgments about harm. However, harmfulness is
not sufficient for morality (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), and it again creates a focus on
defining content rather than looking to the process by which individuals craft and understand
their moral worlds (see also McHugh et al., 2022).
1.2.3 Assumption 3: Action greater than expression
The last assumption is that the primary function of morality is to motivate us to do things.
Aside from models that posit a primarily communicative function of mortality (Cushman et al.,
2019), many models assume that morality is for action––our moral values should drive us to act
in particular ways. But, here again, we argue that this is not always true. There are many
instances in which the way that people end up acting is wholly surprising in the real world (e.g.,
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election), and no clear way to explain the disconnect between action
and expression. For example, there is a spate of research that demonstrates there are
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discrepancies between real and imagined moral behaviors (FeldmanHall, Mobbs, et al., 2012;
FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, et al., 2012, Teper et al., 2011). These findings highlight the disconnect
between what we imagine morality to be and what its functions in real life are—highlighting the
failings of current approaches.
Of course, there are some instances where morality does seem to be for action. Taboo foods
and other religious values, for example, proscribe behaviors within a culture or group that often
have very high compliance (Bulbulia & Mahoney, 2008; Rozin & Wolf, 2008; Tetlock, 2003;
Wu et al., 2014). In the case of moralizing of a particular food type, it motivates the behavior to
avoid consuming it in the future akin to other sacred values (Tetlock, 2003; Ginges et al., 2007).
In spite of this phenomenon, we argue that the evidence is overwhelmingly in the favor of
morality for thinking. For instance, research suggests that individuals will rationalize bad
behaviors before they do them in an effort to preserve one’s positive self-view (e.g., Schweitzer
& Hsee, 2002; Shalvi et al., 2011; 2015). That is, moral information is not being used to guide
behavior as much as a lens from which to understand and judge oneself. Morality is mostly all
talk, little action.
1.2.4 Limitations of these approaches
Each of the theoretical perspectives summarized above offers important insight into the
nature of moral cognition. That there are underlying assumptions to these theories does not imply
that they are wrong. Instead, these underlying assumptions have concealed other important
features of moral cognition—the preference for moral complexity, and the context-sensitivity
and content-focused nature of morality2.

2

To be clear, I reviewed these to highlight the assumptions that we believe they make, rather than arguing that they
are wrong. Instead, the aim is to foreground them to then dispel them. It is also important to note that I do not aim to
adjudicate among or speak to biological, functional, or adaptive theories of the evolutionary development of morality
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Altogether, these current theories of morality––from those about the perception of the mind
to those about emotions and reason––render many moral psychology findings surprising because
baked into them is the assumption that morality is for goodness, some content is necessarily
moral, and morality drives actions. However, if we are focused on noticing and reducing harm
and avoiding negative moral affect, why are people hesitant to exalt do-gooders? Why are we so
captured by negative moral content on social media? Why do we hate hypocrites so much?
Phenomena like do-gooder derogation (where we deride those who are too saintly; Minson &
Monin, 2012; Bashir et al., 2013), moral licensing (behaving immorally after doing something
good; Monin & Miller, 2001; Merritt et al., 2010), the extent to which we detest hypocrites
(Jordan et al., 2017), the conditional nature of our moral (vs. immoral) preferences (Melnikoff &
Bailey, 2018; Alós-Ferrer et al., 2022), and the preferences against being more morally good
ourselves (Sun & Goodwin, 2020) are all challenges for these theories. It’s not clear how mind
perception or emotion and reason arguments help us come to conclusions about these situations
and many more like them.
Without a guiding theory, the study of morality will continue to be a moving target (akin to
the limitations of phenomenal physics; see Chemero, 2009). These theories constitute the moral
landscape from which the study of moral psychology operates, and these few core assumptions
have led to limitations in their applicability to everyday moral phenomena. But these everyday
moral phenomena are precisely of the kind that we should seek to understand. Findings like dogooder derogation and moral licensing, which are usually regarded as surprising by researchers,
should be center to moral theorizing, rather than relegated to its quirks; they highlight the
omnipresence and even desirability of moral ambiguity (and at times, moral badness), and they

(e.g., de Waal, 1996; Hamilton, 1964; Haidt, 2007; Trivers, 1971), but rather theories that expound on how moral
cognition is implemented.

13
are key to understanding the driving forces behind moral cognition. They demonstrate that moral
ambiguity and moral badness can be engaging.
1.3 Morality as worldbuilding
For these reasons, a new theory would benefit the study of morality. Moving from mapping
or focusing on the type of content that makes up the moral domain represents a required shift in
theorizing and empirically testing morality. And notably, Rozin’s theory of moralization already
represents this change and does not fall prey to the same assumptions as the theories listed
above. On his view, the process of moralization (however characterized) is where the crux of the
matter rests—objects and ideas can become moralized or un-moralized over time because they
are subject to situational factors at the individual and societal level (Rozin, 1999). For example,
cigarette smoking made a swift shift into the moral domain. Once firmly normative, this behavior
now sees both laws and scowls directed at encouraging its cessation (Rozin, 1999). Similarly,
vegetarianism has moved into the moral domain for some, and this shift alters decision-making
into something that is instead motivated by moral values rather than mere preferences. Whereas
moral vegetarians resist temptation to meat-based products, health vegetarians do not, owing to
differences in preferences compared to closely held values (Rozin et al., 1997). These cases
demonstrate the fluidity of morality that is often missed in content-focused approaches and has
been replicated and extended in recent literature (Scott et al., 2016). From this lens, anything can
exit and enter the moral domain and what is moral is determined by comparing against your
other values (i.e., moral piggybacking; Feinberg et al., 2019; Rozin, 1999). Those two features
will be borrowed and used as a jumping off point for this theoretical approach.
The theoretical approach introduced in the following section has two main aims: First, it
seeks to capture the fluid and content-free nature of moral cognition. Second, it seeks to
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characterize the function of many everyday moral behaviors. That is, this theory, which is
henceforth referred to as moral worldbuilding theory, bridges work on moralization,
categorization, philosophy, creative literature, and more to make sense of the deep-seated human
motive to understand and explore but in the domain of morality. Morality, we argue is uniquely
interesting because it is socially, evolutionarily, and personally relevant. The allure of morality
reveals that moral cognition is aimed at identifying and understanding moral categorizations to
create a cogent moral worldview––which defines everything from one’s understanding of who is
‘us vs. them’ to one’s attention and preferences in entertainment (see McHugh et al., 2022 for
similar effort).
1.3.1 The art of worldbuilding
Before articulating worldbuilding in the moral domain, it is first necessary to talk about
where the term is being borrowed from—creative writing. Stories are central to being human,
emerging every place our minds touch, from science fiction to science (Zaidi, 2019; Muindi et
al., 2020). They afford transmission of culture and knowledge from generation to generation
(Harari, 2015), and they allow us a safe space for problem solving on individual and societal
levels 3 (Carroll, 2008; Gottschall, 2014). To craft stories that extend beyond reality, authors
typically turn to the process of worldbuilding. Worldbuilding, which is the process of
constructing an imaginary world, is a crucial ingredient in any effective fiction (GwenllianJones, 2004). It entails creating an imaginary model world from which the characters, rules,
physics, and more exist. This includes everything from what the landscape looks like to what the

3

Carroll (2008) makes the point that movies and cinema allow us to learn about the self by rousing previously
unknown feelings and associations. This is an important observation for understanding fiction and the allure of
simulating moral minds. Moral traits are held closely to one’s general sense of self and change to those traits
(whether actual or perceived) can be threatening. Imaginary spaces afford learning and growing without threat the
self.
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characters emotions and personalities are like. It requires internal consistency (much like the real
world), and it enable the author to create a dynamic relationship between the story and the reader
(Roine, 2016). It provides a framework from which the narrative and characters can spring to
life; this process allows us to be transported by, imagine, and meaningfully connect to fictional
milieu (see Dubourg & Baumard, 2021 for careful treatment of the power of these worlds).
The lens of worldbuilding is also useful for synthesizing multiple aspects of moral
psychology. From this perspective, we are all the authors of our own moral worlds—worlds
which are composed of “useful fictions” (see Cushman, 2020 for a narrower interpretation).
Much like the magical world of Harry Potter or the intergalactic universe of Star Wars, our moral
worlds require internal consistency, vividness, culture, communicable norms, emotional
resonance and stakes, and constant epistemic maintenance and learning. Like worldbuilding in
fiction, there is a dynamic relationship between the author and the outside world. As culture and
technology shift, so too do the rules and expectations around us. For example, many individual
values shifted following the Supreme Court ruling that lead to the federal legalization of gay
marriage (Tankard & Paluck, 2017). This cultural change fundamentally altered the rules and
expectations of reality—rules and expectations that intersect with the moral domain. As a result,
broad change ensued and spurred a number of changes on the individual and societal levels
(Tankard & Paluck, 2016). That is, how individuals understood the rules and moral norms of
their worlds changed. Moral worldbuilding acknowledges that shifts like this can occur often and
that coupling of the dynamic nature of our moral worlds with the importance of morality for
fitness and self-concept means that we should be especially tuned to moral information in our
environments.
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1.3.2 Moral worldbuilding
Akin to the worlds created by Tolkien or Austen, we all possess and implement the
psychological skills necessary to construct detailed fictions about how the moral world looks and
behaves (e.g., misremembering moral failings; Carlson et al., 2020). This process of moral
worldbuilding requires learning, context, and moral cognition to bring it to bare, and is
maintained in part by other mechanisms already in place to protect one’s psychological
wellbeing. We construct our moral worlds, and we learn and recognize moral values from that
vantage point. Moral worldbuilding, like many of our emotions, is not about maximizing some
normative notion of good or right, but rather, it can be thought of as functionally maximizing
epistemic coherence with worldview. That is, the moral worldbuilding framework suggests that
many functions of moral states are of the epistemic variety. Moral worldbuilding prompts
emotions that motive a range of cognitions and behaviors.
This view of the function of morality departs from how, for example, pain works. In
general (with the unfortunate exception of congenital insensitivity to pain), people simply want
less pain. And there are obvious adaptive advantages for such an inclination––avoiding the sorts
of things that cause us pain are important to our physical and psychological survival. But
morality is not like pain. We are not optimizing our or others’ goodness nor minimizing badness.
Instead, morality is like our emotional systems, which are founded on learning, context, salience,
relevance, and homeostasis. Morality is one (particularly consequential) kind of emotion that is
necessarily oriented towards self-epistemology and self-regulation. That is, moral states and
moral information prompts epistemic functions much like how an epistemic emotion operates.
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1.4 Morality, emotion, and epistemology
To position moral worldbuilding akin to epistemic emotions, it is first necessary to
outline what we mean by the term. Epistemic emotions are the emotions for which the catalyst is
the individual’s own cognitive state (Brun et al., 2008; but see Carruthers, 2017) 4. These are
important features of our psychology––helping orient us toward effective ways of understanding
and exploring our environments. For example, emotions like surprise, confusion, and curiosity
are each considered epistemic emotions because they are triggered by cognitions related to
beliefs about knowledge5 (Kang et al., 2009; Vogl et al., 2020). Such emotions are critical to
problem solving, knowledge acquisition, exploration, and other largely epistemic functions (De
Sousa, 2008; 2011; Pekrun & Stephens, 2012; Trevors et al., 2017). Much like morality, the
valence of these emotions tells us less than their motivational direction. For instance, confusion,
which is generally experiences as a negative state, motivates approach-oriented information
gathering, and is consequently linked to enhanced learning (D’Mello et al., 2014). Epistemic
emotions support belief-acquisition processes by making salient the times when contradictions
and inconsistencies are relevant to a given task. That is, the content of epistemic emotions is
driven (if not determined) by epistemic goals (e.g., certainty, consistency, meaning; Proulx &
Heine, 2010; Hennes et al., 2012), and the cognitive activities that align behavior with those
goals (see Hookway, 2003; 2008).
The features of epistemic emotions support their prominent (but often overlooked) role in
human psychology. Here, we are adopting the approach by Brun et al. (2008) to categorizing

4

Morton (2010) also considered a moral-adjacent emotion to be epistemic by focusing on generosity (arguably a
prosocial moral emotion).
5
Happiness also promotes exploration and play (Frederickson, 2004), but unlike surprise or curiosity, it does not
prompt approach-oriented behaviors because of an expectancy violation or a stimulus/behavior that does not match
our priors. It is likely that people feel happiness following reconciliation of mismatch in the form of satisfaction.
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those features as a way to explicitly define how emotions may influence or guide epistemic
functions (see also Pekrun et al., 2017). To start, Brun et al. (2008) lays out the first
characteristic of an epistemic emotion—that it is motivationally energizing. Epistemic emotions
(under the right emotional regulatory circumstances; see Hookway, 2008) often drive us to
approach and explore new things and to withdraw and avoid others (Vogl et al., 2020; De Hooge
et al., 2010)6. That is, these emotions often contribute to the motivation to explore and to exploit
our environments (da Sousa, 2009)—two behaviors that are critical to learning. For example,
individuals who are dispositionally curious tend to adapt quicker and more efficiently to new
workplace settings (Harrison et al., 2011) 7. The benefits of being motivated epistemically also
extend to the educational setting. Evidence suggests that when students experience epistemic
emotions related to science, they are more likely to persist to problem solve (Jaber & Hammer,
2016). Another characteristic of epistemic emotions is that they support what is salient and
relevant to an individual (Berlyne, 1960; 1966; Hookway, 2003; Lazarus, 1991). Novelty, for
example, is highly individually sensitive. What is novel to one person may not be novel to
another, and so the resultant interest or curiosity to explore a given novel object or situation is
predicated on it being appraised as such (Lazarus, 1991; Silva & Kashdan, 2009).
The final three aspects of emotions that afford epistemic functions can be grouped
together (though see Brun et al., 2008 for individual treatment). Emotions can characteristically

6

The various epistemic emotions do, of course, differ from one another on a number of dimensions. For example,
shame is more often associated with withdrawal than curiosity. However, it is not the variety in epistemic emotions
that is the central focus of the present analysis. Instead, the focus is on the kinds of functions that these emotions
serve—functions which connect to and illuminate moral functions.
7
Moral Worldbuilding as a framework suggests that morally relevant epistemic emotions drive the building,
exploring, and maintaining of our moral worlds. There are also other situational and dispositional features which
may shape moral worldbuilding. For example, if someone is chronically depressed, the salience of a given moral
target may not be sufficient to engender action or exploration. Basic emotions like sadness and happiness likely
interact with Moral Worldbuilding motives in interesting ways. However, those interactions are outside of the
purview of the present analysis.
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give us epistemic access to facts and beliefs, provide access to non-propositional knowledge, and
allow for epistemic efficiency. For instance, during a late night at trivia a feeling of confusion
about a scientific fact might reveal that one holds a certain, contradictory commitment. Further,
the confidence felt toward the approach to a question might also indicate that one’s method of
arriving at answers to these kinds of questions is well understood. And both functions help to
enhance the speed and efficiency of knowledge-seeking and knowledge acquisition (akin to
heuristics). Figure 1 includes an overview of each of these features of epistemic emotions,
including the kinds of events that trigger epistemic emotions, and their consequences for
cognitions and knowledge-seeking.

Figure 1. A summary (not exhaustive) of the general triggers of epistemic emotions, the goals,
and the ways that they motivate cognitions and behaviors. Adapted from Brun et al. (2008).
This epistemic emotion framework also has the benefit of taking seriously the arguments
that emotions are facets working in concert with reason (Elgin, 2008). As noted, many prominent
moral theories devote a great deal of time and space to defining emotion, reason, and intuition
(and redefining them; May, 2018) in an attempt to isolate which of them most significantly

20
affects moral cognition. However, these definitional debates rely on a false dichotomy between
emotion and reason (see also Woodward, 2016), one that is quickly and clearly dispelled by an
epistemic emotion framework. On this view, epistemic emotions are key to understanding
contemporary moral psychology because epistemic emotions support the acquisition, appraisal,
and understanding of morally-relevant information––and ultimately the maintenance and
construction of a coherent moral worldview.
1.4.1 Morality, epistemology, and moral worldbuilding
Adopting the criteria described above and applying it to morality, it is clear that morality
prompts similar knowledge-related motives. Morality has functions that are similar to those of
the epistemic emotion system—emotions that support learning, integration of context, salience
and relevance, and even homeostasis. Morality motivates us to explore and exploit our
environments and to reduce punishment, it incites and supports learning (see Railton, 2017), it
shapes beliefs and supports integration of facts, it influences confidence about judgments and
beliefs, and it attracts attention to morally salient information. The moral worldbuilding
framework posits that moral information motivates epistemic functions that mirror those of
classic epistemic emotions. This worldbuilding lens allows us to move beyond focusing on the
specific content that makes up morality, and instead focus on the cognitive and perceptual
processes that support the existence of the moral being and their interfacing with the
environment. As such, this epistemic approach to moral worldbuilding is necessarily an
embodied one. The cognitive functions (and the behaviors) that morality motivates and shapes
can only be understood by taking the perceiver and the environment equally into account.
This embodied lens of moral worldbuilding mirrors epistemic emotions in a number of
ways, but it differs in three key areas. First, the goal of moral worldbuilding differs from that of
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traditional epistemic emotions. The goal of moral worldbuilding is to preserve moral coherence,
rather than make accurate inferences about reality 8. In this way, morality looks a lot like other
strongly held attitudes (e.g., moral convictions; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, 2010; Skitka &
Morgan, 2014), and it is particularly oriented toward the self. Indeed, a spate of research
suggests that people are willing and capable of going go through many mental hoops in the
service of maintaining a positive self-view (Anderson et al., 2012; Balcetis, 2008; Steele et al.,
1993; Svenson, 1981), strongly held opinions (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda, 1990), and
erroneous beliefs about verifiable facts (e.g., conspiracy theories; Flynn et al., 2017; see Douglas
et al., 2019). Maintaining moral coherence is not about maintaining an accurate representation of
the moral world9, but one that fits with an individual’s understanding of their world (which is
notably sensitive to one’s moral convictions; see Yoder & Decety, 2022). And indeed, balance
and clarity in one’s worldview is generally central to psychological well-being. For example, this
motivation is critical to the upkeep psychological immune system (Gilbert, 2006). People are
motivated to avoid the psychological discomfort of having beliefs challenged (Quilty-Dunn &
Mandelbaum, 2017; Mandelbaum, 2020). And evidence suggests that epistemic attitudes are
linked to self-regulatory functioning (e.g., Stinson et al., 2010). For instance, by recalling one’s
past moral transgressions, people shift their present moral beliefs and behaviors to compensate
and return to equilibrium—an effect that is specific to the moral self (Jordan et al., 2011). The
maintenance of one’s moral world supports both the confirmatory processes (e.g., rationalization

8

Other research finds that motives to maintain coherence constrains what kind of feedback we decide is relevant
(Elder et al., 2021).
9
Because of this fact, what is “moral” is dynamic and flexible. Morals are powerful determinants of how we think
about ourselves and others, but they are also sensitive to motivation, context, and identity. A staunch Conservative
in the United States may see themselves as pro-life—a moral position—but when gun rights are under fire after a
school tragedy may no longer see the harm or potential for harm to human life as a relevant moral concern. Instead,
they may voice support for the right to bear arms. This is why a single “harm” focused criteria is not always a
helpful lens for understanding what counts as moral, but rather a dense network of values with nodes that are on or
off based on context.
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and finding ways to restore the belief that one is morally good; Raney, 2002) and the reduction
processes that seek to diminish aversive feelings that may be associated with holding
incompatible beliefs about one’s strongly held attitudes (Sachdeva et al., 2009). This framework
also builds off of the rich history in social psychological theory that pertains to how epistemic
motives affect individual psychology (for a review, Proulx et al., 2012). Many epistemic motives
are directly relevant to the moral domain (e.g., System Justification Theory; Jost et al., 2004;
Meaning Maintenance Model; Heine et al., 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2010; Just World Theory;
Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). The primary goal of moral motives, then, like many other
psychological mechanisms (see Gawronski & Strack, 2012), reflects a desire for reducing
expectation violation. That is, moral coherence marks the goal for which morality is primarily
tuned.
Second, moral worldbuilding emerges only in relation to moral objects––not all objects
engage the moral cognitive processes that support moral worldbuilding. While it is interesting
that moral information scaffolds several more general cognitive processes (e.g., modal cognition;
Phillips & Cushman, 2017), the triggering of moral worldbuilding motives relies on the
perceiving of moral properties, whose value can be accrued through learned, context, and
relations. Indeed, prominent theories in moral psychology underscore the diversity in moral
value, influenced by norms and culture (Graham et al., 2011; Curry, Chesters et al., 2019; Curry,
Whitehouse et al., 2019). For example, research finds that direct harm leads to moral
condemnation across many cultures, but the role of intention (i.e., did someone apply personal
force with the intention of harming another) differs across cultures (Bago et al., 2022; see also
Barrett et al., 2016). Given this diversity, it is clear that moral properties must be learned
(Railton, 2017; but see Cushman et al., 2017) and differ between individuals (i.e., individual
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differences; Reed et al., 2007). For example, research from developmental moral psychology
highlights the critical role learning plays in internalizing moral value and differentiating it from
other kinds of value—even children notice that there’s something different about breaking moral
norms compared to breaking social norms (e.g., Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana et al., 2014).
Further, moral properties must also be contextually situated and relational, both of which heavily
influence moral cognition (e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2011). For example, when in a heightened
emotional state (even an incidental one) moral condemnation tends to increase (Eskine et al.,
2011; Schnall et al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2011)10. Moreover, research suggests that
relationship contexts, like whether a transgressor is a family member, or an acquaintance
influences moral judgments—we are more likely to be motivated to reconcile our positive beliefs
about family members with their transgressive behavior than for strangers (Simpson et al., 2016;
McManus et al., 2020). The same is true of group members (see Ellemers, 2017). Group
membership––the understanding of oneself and others as constituent parts of a whole––affects
neural activation patterns in regions of the brain that support moral judgment (Molenberghs et
al., 2016) and affects moral judgments even when moral norms are unambiguous (Cornwell et
al., 2019). Taken together, evidence suggests that the kinds of motives that moral worldbuilding
drives are ones that are necessarily shaped by personal learning, relationships, motivations,
beliefs, as well as the external world.
Lastly, contrary to domain general epistemic emotions, moral worldbuilding motives
triggers cognitions and behaviors that systematically differ from those of epistemic emotions (see

10

It is also important to note that a meta-analysis conducted by Landy and Goodwin (2015) suggests that the effect
of incidental disgust on moral condemnation is low (or absent). However, given evidence that traits and states may
affect severity of condemnation, I am inclined to include the evidence (e.g., Sherman et al., 2012)
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Figure 2)11. The suite of relevant judgments and behaviors, similar to the objects of moral
worldbuilding emotions, are largely morally relevant. For example, moral outrage assuages
moral guilt by acting as a method to rebalance one’s personal moral identity (Green et al.,
2019)—affirmations to moral identity in completely unrelated contexts similarly assuage guilt
(Rothschild & Keefer, 2017). Further, judgments about moral blame (e.g., Malle et al., 2014;
Alicke, 2008; Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012), punishment behaviors, public ostracism, moral
norm violations, information about morality of minds, all point to the necessarily morally
relevant content that sparks moral worldbuilding to come online.

Figure 2. A summary (not exhaustive) of the triggers of epistemic morality, and the ways that it
motivates cognitions and behaviors.
1.4.2 Summary and synthesis of moral worldbuilding motives as epistemic emotions
The process of maintaining a coherent moral world is a central function of morality on the
individual level, and it is one that makes sense of otherwise surprising findings. Why do people

11

This view also resembles one offered by Cornwell and Higgins (2019), which suggests that research on
motivation demonstrates the importance of moving away from understanding morality from a value lens to using
motivation for truth and control as processes provide a richer understanding of moral judgment.
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morally license? In order to maintain a favorable view of themselves. Why do people hate
hypocrites? Hypocrites are people who have necessarily surprised us—their stated moral values
differ from their actions. This inconsistency sparks a compensatory process where the hypocrite
is no longer held in high moral regard. Why don’t we want to be more morally good ourselves?
Our moral status is central to who we are, and this provides the basis of our moral worlds.
Shifting that perception would require reconfiguring of our understanding of our moral worlds,
an effort that is not likely high on our lists of priorities (given that we seek structure; see Landau
et al., 2015 for review). The construction and maintenance of one’s moral worldview is
scaffolded by motives that are epistemic in their function and it is a lifelong process. The term
‘worldbuilding’, borrowed from the art of creative writing, refers to the process by which an
author creates a world with coherent internal rules, laws, logic, and history. This process extends
beyond merely creating a novel setting, with dynamic goals, motives, and experiences of the
characters (Gwenllian-Jones, 2004) but also to the moral domain, guiding knowledge acquisition
processes. Critically, our moral worlds are internally consistent but also works of fiction (see
Cushman, 2020 for discussion of rationalization as one tool to maintain and extract values and
beliefs). Coherence of the moral world––not accuracy––is the goal. And, indeed, the role of
coherence in morality is already well documented; people shift their beliefs about consequences
to match their moral evaluations (Liu & Ditto, 2013), shift their moral evaluations to match their
beliefs about consequences (Gino et al., 2010), but nonetheless expect good people to do good
things and bad people to do bad things (Callan et al., 2013; Lerner, 1980). Altogether, this
framework suggests a primary role for the self and the environment in morality––looking at only
one will necessarily ignore important antecedents and consequences of morality.
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1.5 Moral Curiosity
From a domain general lens, curiosity is considered one kind of information-seeking drive
(see Kidd & Hayde, 2015 for review). William James defined curiosity as the “impulse towards
better cognition” (James, 1899), underscoring the approach-oriented nature of the drive and its
applicability to a wide range of cognitive processes. Curiosity comes online when there is a gap
in knowledge or understanding (Loewenstein, 1994) 12, and it drives information gathering
behaviors and cognitions in animals (Pavolov, 1927), children (Gopnik, 2000; Jirout & Klahr,
2012; Smith et al., 2018), and adults (Hartung & Renner, 2013; Markey & Loewenstein, 2014)
alike. Curiosity is critical to (among other things) exploration and learning (Gruber &
Ranganath, 2019; Kidd & Hayde, 2015), and it is a common driver of humans’ attraction to the
arts and entertainment (Berlyne, 1966)—a key area of inquiry for the present analysis.
While there are many morally relevant epistemic motives that fall under the purview of
moral worldbuilding motives, the present analysis will focus on curiosity directed toward moral
content, or moral curiosity13. Other examples of moral epistemic motives include moral surprise
(e.g., reaction to a hypocrite) or moral confusion (e.g., feeling that follows moral value
inconsistent information). Moral curiosity should operate the same—driving the same kinds of
cognitions and behaviors—as domain general curiosity, but is specifically in reference to moral
cognitions, behaviors, and content. The drive of moral curiosity can help reveal what drives
interest in moral badness and moral ambiguity in the real-world. Research suggests that curiosity
follows a U-shape as a function of confidence (Kang et al., 2009). That is, when the absolute
value of confidence is extreme, curiosity is low. However, when confidence is lacking, falling

12

Loewenstein also argues that curiosity is necessarily intrinsically motivated, but like many others (e.g., Kidd &
Hayden, 2015), I find this view unnecessarily restrictive.
13
Moral curiosity is also itself considered a virtue by some for providing an avenue for meaning in life
(Baumgarten, 2001).
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somewhere in the middle of no and extreme confidence, curiosity peaks. In the moral domain,
we might expect a similar pattern to emerge as a function of the certainty of categorization of
moral content. Why is moral ambiguity so prominently featured in our entertainment? One
reason might be that when moral information is unclear, we are most motivated to seek out
additional information and engage with the content. This research uses the morality “as
experienced” (Schein, 2020) starting point and plans to examine it by extending the extant moral
and philosophical literature to investigate why moral badness and ambiguity prompts curiosity
and explanation-seeking.
1.5.1 Explanations in morality
Curiosity can drive us toward many types of information. General information-seeking
tends to revolve around the question of “what” (e.g., see Kelly & Sharot, 2021; Sharot &
Sunstein, 2020). In contrast, explanation-seeking takes the drive for knowledge one-step further
to identify the reasons behind the target of curiosity. That is, explanation-seeking asks “why” and
“how”, and it is fundamental to cognition. And it’s no wonder—asking “why” facilitates
cognitive development and help humans make sense of their worlds. Explanation-seeking impels
us to deeply engage with concepts, and it is a satisfying endeavor (Gopnik, 1998). Even young
children often display this potent need for why (Liquin & Lombrozo, 2020a; Liquin &
Lombrozo, 2020b)14. When seeking explanations, children do not find mere attention
sufficient—they really do want to know why (Chouinard et al., 2007), will ask follow-up
questions when an unsatisfactory answer is given (Kurkul & Corriveau, 2018), and show
preferences towards information sources that provide the concrete sorts of reasons they are after
(Corriveau & Kurkul, 2014). And while both children and adults seek explanations throughout

After a short weekend with a friend with a 3-year-old, I can confidentially assert that this need for “why” answers
is so present in young children that it is nearly insatiable.
14
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the life span, this drive peaks around preschool age (ages 2-4; Chouinard et al., 2007) when the
need to create knowledge structures that accurately represent the world is strong. Children are
driven to build up explanations for how the world looks and its rules, and they are motivated to
resolve disequilibrium (Piaget 1955/2013). Research suggests that children are more likely to
seek out causal explanations in conversations with adults than noncausal information (Frazier et
al., 2009; Callanan & Oakes, 1992). Children want to know about how the world works.
Looking specifically to the moral domain, a quick search of Reddit’s Explain like I’m
Five (ELI5) reveals that adults are also often curious about the reasons that underlie or explain
moral things15. For example, moral themes including those about real and fictional villains
frequently populate the website forum (e.g., “Where [did] Hitler's ideologies came from”, “Is
there an underlying biological cause behind serial killers, mass shooters, child molesters, and
violent criminals?”) 16. Much of the general structure of the world of an adult is already known,
but the minds of others are consistently opaque to us. Moral themes may be so pervasive and
questions about the moral atrocities that others have committed may be interesting because it is
providing real information about how other people see the world, and real information about how
good and evil operate. That is, explanations—insight into the minds of others—may be the most
persistent epistemic motives that adults have because it is always relevant information to their
understanding of how the world works (not to mention one’s own safety when affiliating with
others17). By understanding how to categorize others we can maintain our moral worldviews and
reap the associated emotional and cognitive benefits. The process of categorization is an

15

Learning from curiosity also improves over the life span (Gruber & Fandakova, 2021).
Interestingly, one Reddit-er from this forum even asked the question that drives this dissertation: “Why are we so
fascinated by serial killers despite knowing that they commit grotesque acts?”
17
There is evidence that affiliative motives are also culturally dependent. Individuals from Western civilizations
tend to prefer deontologists as social partners, but this is not true of nomadic, non-Western societies (Smith &
Apicella, 2022).
16
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important aspect of any causal reasoning (Rehder, 2003). It is a more central feature to human
categorization than effect features (Ahn et al., 2000). It’s no wonder, then, that cause—and the
seeking of its relevant explanations—is also a foundational motive shared across people.
1.5.2 Ambiguity and explanations in morality
Ambiguous moral targets likely play a special role in moral curiosity motives. Like
domain general curiosity, moral curiosity likely peaks when we are unsure. Unlike simplicity of
the morality of villains or heroes, which researchers have referred to as moral pornography
(Pizarro & Baumeister, 2013), most of the people we encounter in day-to-day life are ambiguous
(including ourselves; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogl; 2015). They don’t have conspicuous signals of
their moral status, and so they reliably trigger curiosity, interest, and engagement despite
research that suggests people categorize ambiguous moral targets as worse than good ones
(Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012). Without clear signals of moral status (e.g., devil horns or halos),
we are forced to learn about and evaluate their moral character for ourselves (which we do so
effortlessly; see Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2012; Fiske et al., 2007; Hamlin et al., 2007).
Another reason moral ambiguity might play a special role in prompting moral curiosity is
that ambiguous moral people are necessarily comprised of conflicting moral signals. In
entertainment, these kinds of characters are called morally ambiguous characters (Eden et al.,
2015; 2017; Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogl; 2015; Tamborini et al., 2010).
They behave in immoral ways but have redeeming qualities or values. For example, Tony
Soprano is widely considered a morally ambiguous character because he is a murderer and an
adulterer, but he is extremely loyal and devoted to his family. These conflicting signals make for
a more unpredictable character that likely leads to more prediction errors than villains or saints.
And detecting prediction errors is often rewarded, as in the case of humor, and it may function to
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“debug” one’s belief structures by finding faulty assumptions (for a review, see Hurley et al.,
2011). The interestingness of moral ambiguity, then, can be seen as one trigger to begin
“debugging” one’s moral worldview to resolve contradictions and inconsistencies (see Figure 3),
making it a potentially special trigger of moral curiosity that prompts learning and feelings of
satisfaction (which classifying something as morally wrong affords; Nguyen & Williams, 2020),
and reinforces the moral curiosity motive. That is, as moral information is noticed and triggers
inconsistencies or a contradiction, it prompts curiosity and explanation-seeking. This process
leads to both perceptions of learning and a feeling of satisfaction, which serve to reinforce the
curiosity drive.

Figure 3. Flow chart of the reinforcing cycle of moral curiosity. This chart was adapted from
Muryama (2022).
1.6 Present investigation
The present research integrates multiple theories to explore moral worldbuilding.
Specifically, we examine moral curiosity and test whether moral ambiguity is a unique trigger.
This perspective makes two unique predictions: If morality is like an epistemic emotion, then the
presence of ambiguous or surprising moral content should be (1) alluring and (2) moderated by
relevant individual differences. On the moral worldbuilding view, a coherent moral world is the
primary goal that motivates moral cognition, and when information in the moral domain does not

31
fit that worldview, it should trigger curiosity. This worldbuilding framework also predicts that
the worldview of an individual should determine what kinds of content are interesting and
engaging. Indeed, recent research supports this worldview maintenance approach––when
individuals are motivated to maintain consistency, they no longer endorse restrictions on
disagreeable speech acts (Eftedal & Thomsen, 2021; see also Campbell & Kumar, 2012). The
primary aim of the present research is to expand current theorizing about morality by focusing on
real world attraction to moral ambiguity and badness, and to examine which dispositions
influence that relationship.
Moral ambiguity is operationalized as one type of unresolved moral goal (e.g.,
Ovsiankina, 1928)––one which challenges an individual’s moral world, and is often in need of
categorization as right or wrong (McHugh et al., 2022). From this perspective, testable
hypotheses regarding the worldbuilding approach to morality can be derived. First, moral
ambiguity should be interesting (more so than straightforward moral good). There are some
reasons to think that moral ambiguity might be equally interesting compared to moral badness
(see Bloom, 2021a for discussion), but this may be up to a point where curiosity begins to fall off
as in the case of confidence for domain general curiosity. For instance, morally bad characters
depicted in fictional entertainment typically do not seem realistic, which makes them more
appreciated as characters (Konijn & Hoom, 2005). This might also make their bad actions more
interesting because they are not real, and thus contain unknowns that prompt curiosity. As such,
the proposed research will examine moral badness and moral ambiguity in an exploratory
manner. Lastly, the second main hypothesis is that curiosity for moral ambiguity should be
specific to the moral domain. That is, people tend to prefer predictability in their lives (e.g.,
Walker et al., 2021), and are particularly concerned with the moral actions of others (e.g., Landy
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et al., 2016; Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013; Turpin et al., 2021). Moral ambiguity should motivate
us to resolve moral ambiguity when we see it because it is the most important social dimension
(Landy et al., 2016). It should specifically prompt us seek out more information about unlikely
and novel stimuli, and to otherwise see things as objectively right or wrong (Skitka, 2020).
The first set of experiments test the primary claims of the curiosity motive and moral
worldbuilding. Three experiments (a pilot experiment and experiments 1a and 1b) examine
whether people are more interested to learn about morally ambiguous or morally bad
information compared to morally good information, and whether individual differences in traits
like morbid curiosity (the desire to seek out morbid content) moderate moral curiosity. The pilot
experiment begins the investigation using morally ambiguous characters, villains, and heroes
from popular TV shows and movies. Experiments 1a and 1b test this same pattern using two
different manipulations of moral status. In Experiment 1a, participants are told about the
consensus of someone’s actions provided by other people (i.e., a social cue to moral status). In
Experiment 1b, participants are told about an algorithmic classification of the actions of a series
of individuals. Each of these experiments pits descriptive information-seeking (i.e., fact-seeking)
against explanation-seeking (i.e., seeking more information about the mind of the individual).
In Experiment 2, we expand the investigation into moral curiosity by directly comparing
which Moral Status Types is preferred when the available information is kept constant (i.e.,
always explanation-seeking information). Moreover, this experiment also examines the role of
confidence in moral curiosity, and test whether curiosity leads to greater feelings of satisfaction
and perceived and actual learning (see Liquin & Lombrozo, 2022).
Finally, Experiment 3, examines whether moral ambiguity is indeed special by comparing
it to another important source of ambiguity––aesthetic (i.e., beauty) ambiguity. Morality and the
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aesthetic domain share a lot of qualities. For example, sentiments are crucial ingredients to both
aesthetics and morality 18 (e.g., Hume, 1757/2017; Korsmeyer, 1976), and evaluative judgments
are powerful determinants of their perceived social value (Klebl, Greenway, et al., 2021; Klebl,
Rhee, et al., 2021; Kuipers et al., 2019). Indeed, research suggests that the link between aesthetic
value and moral value is often direct—when someone is considered unattractive, people are more
likely to assume that they are also immoral (Klebl, Greenway, et al., 2021; Klebl, Rhee, et al.,
2021). This link is also exploited in common depictions of villains in entertainment. Villains
often dawn facial scars or other facial deformities to evoke feelings of wickedness (Croley et al.,
2017). Taken together, the tight association between aesthetics and morality makes the aesthetics
domain a particularly useful comparison to test for the unique appeal of moral ambiguity 19.
Aside from pilot experiments, all sample sizes, hypotheses, analyses, and exclusion criteria
were preregistered on the Open Science Foundation (OSF; https://osf.io/dgxuk). Each survey
was distributed via Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). All studies reported were
approved by the CUNY IRB, and all research was performed in accordance with relevant
guidelines. We note any deviations from the preregistered plan in the main text and report
additional analyses, including descriptive statistics for target dependent variables in Appendix C.

18

Though Hume notably argued that morally flawed things are also aesthetically flawed. I do not intend to adopt
that view here, but rather note that at its core this view suggests a powerful role for sentiment in morality, which is
shared with the aesthetic domain.
19
Other important domains to person perception include sociability and competence (Fiske et al., 2007). However,
sociability is often confounded with morality, especially in entertainment (though they are separable in the lab;
Brambilla et al., 2011). Competence is less often confounded with morality than sociability, but unlike morality or
sociability, competence is domain specific. In other words, the competence of someone in a particular setting is not
informative of their competence in another setting. In contrast, someone’s morality (or their beauty) is a part of their
essence—it is carried with them across settings and time.
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CHAPTER II
Moral curiosity for explanations
2.1 Pilot Study: Exploring curiosity for fictional characters
Themes around good and evil permeate throughout many narratives in life. From the
stories we engage in fiction and in religious texts to the judgments that we make about others.
The morality of characters in fiction and entertainment represents a crystallization of the
powerful moral norms in our modern society. In films, video games, and more, the plot often
centers around a character that fights with and makes salient the moral norms. They do this
through breaking some norms and upholding others, and their motives thus seem complicated.
We set out to investigate whether people prefer to learn about fictional characters with
complicated moral pasts compared to characters that are either morally good or morally bad. In a
pilot study, we pit famous fictional antiheroes and villains against heroes from TV and movies.
This approach builds on work in media psychology that suggests morally ambiguous characters
are highly identifiable with the self (e.g., Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogl; 2015; Tsay & Krakowiak,
2011; see also Cohen, 2006), and research that suggest moral badness piques interest (Bloom,
2020; Bloom 2021; Krause & Rucker, 2020). We hypothesized that the ambiguous characters
and villains would be more interesting to learn about than the heroes.
Method
Design
The pilot study used a fully within-in subjects design to examine the effect of fictional
character type (antiheroes, heroes, or villains) on decision-making.
Participants
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We collected data from 69 consenting participants on Prolific. The only inclusion
criterion was current United States residence to ensure that participants were likely to be familiar
with the fictional characters. Of these participants, 7 did not pass the task comprehension check
items. As such, we report the subset of participants who completed all measures and passed task
comprehension checks. We conducted our analyses on a final sample of 62 participants (Mage =
29.82, SDage = 8.6, Male = 26, Female = 34, 2 = Other) who answered questions about at least
one of three presented issues. All 62 of those participants passed self-reported attentiveness
checks. Participants were paid $3.80 on average for their participation
Materials
Deck Decision Task
The pilot experiment tested whether moral ambiguity sparks curiosity for explanationseeking (i.e., it is engaging) by assessing preferences for competing sources of information. We
used a modified empathy task (Cameron et al., 2019) where participants were introduced to two
playing card decks, one called the “Describe” deck and one called the “Learn” deck (see Figure
4). Participants were asked to select one of the decks on each trial. In the instructions portion of
the experiment, participants were told about the kind of information available when selecting
each of the decks, and they were told that they could select any deck on any trial and were free to
change their minds often. The “Describe” deck yielded physical appearance related information
and a single image of the character (i.e., factual information), and the “Learn” deck yielded
information about the moral motives (i.e., explanation information) of that character with no
image. That is, the descriptive information does not offer the same in-depth mind explanation for
the character that the “Learn” deck did, thus allowing us to test whether morally ambiguous and
morally bad minds more often elicit curiosity for explanations. We also assumed that descriptive
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information is generally more boring than motive information, and so we included the picture of
the target in order to create two closely matched options. On each trial, participants were shown
the two decks to select from and a name of a familiar hero (e.g., Captain America), antihero (e.g.,
Severus Snape), or villain (e.g., Hannibal Lecter) in completely random order. For both decks,
participants were also asked to write two keywords that describe the information they were
shown and then answer questions about their interest in the character, and how good and bad the
character is. This task was used to see whether individuals preferred to learn about the motives of
morally ambiguous characters (vs. a description of their appearance).
Character Stimuli
We brainstormed a series of characters and selected 30 popular characters from TV and
cinema who we thought best met the criteria of a hero (e.g., Superman), a villain (e.g., Lex
Luthor), and an antihero (e.g., Han Solo; Eden et al., 2015; Krakowiak & Tsay-Vogel, 2015;
Raney, 2004). We then had laboratory research assistants indicate their familiarity with each of
the characters and selected the top 10 most familiar characters from each of the three categories.
All name stimuli were presented in Arial 16-point font in all caps. The full list of selected
characters is available in Appendix A.

Figure 4. Example of a single deck task trial with a villain name as the stimulus.
Manipulation Checks
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To ensure that we accurately categorized our selected characters used as antiheroes, heroes,
or villains, we asked participants to answer two manipulation check items. Following each
decision in the main experimental task, participants were asked “How morally good is this
person?” and “How morally bad is this person?” measured on a scale from 1 = Not at all to 9 =
Extremely.
Self-reported Interest
As noted above, we also measured self-reported interest for each of the characters on a
trial level. We asked participants “How interesting is this person?” on a trial level, again rated on
a scale from 1 = Not at all to 9 = Extremely.
Character Familiarity Checks
At the end of the experiment, we also asked participants to indicate whether they were
familiar with each of the fictional characters they were presented prior to this experiment. They
were asked a binary “yes” or “no” for each name presented. This measure was used to ensure
that results of the main task replicated with only the subset of participants who knew about the
characters prior to the experiment. We did not conduct any additional analyses using this
measure.
Procedure
Participants chose between the two decks: a “learn” deck that offered information about
the motives and morals of the character, or a “describe” deck that offered an image and
information about their appearance. On each randomly presented trial, participants saw the name
of a character and the two decks to choose from. After selecting their deck, participants had to
write in three words to describe the character and indicate their interest and complete
manipulation checks for each character (i.e., on a trial level). A total of 30 characters, ten heroes,
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ten antiheroes, and ten villains were presented. Participants were then asked whether they
recognized each character individually, asked about their attentiveness, and basic demographic
information. Finally, participants were debriefed and paid for their participation.
Results
Target analyses were run using all trials from participants and excluding participants who
did not understand instructions (N = 7). However, the results remain mostly unchanged when we
use only the subset of participants who were familiar with the characters they saw. When we
subset only familiar character trials, all predicted patterns get stronger. As a stringent test, we
include all trials here. These analyses use the ‘lme4’ package (Bates et al, 2015) and the
‘lmerTest’ package (Kuznetsova et al., 2017) to compute model p-values using R statistical
analysis software (R Core Team, 2019). Each survey was distributed via Qualtrics survey
software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Each of the target analyses uses linear mixed-effects models
with participants modeled as random unless otherwise stated.
Manipulation Check
The two “good” and “bad” trial level items were used to ensure that characters selected to
represent heroes were seen as more “good” than both antiheroes and villains, and that characters
selected to be villains were seen as more “bad” than both antiheroes and heroes. Results
suggested that the manipulations were successful. Participants rated the heroes as significantly
more “good” than both the villains (b = −4.56, SE = 0.12, t(1185) = −39.00, p < .001, r = 0.75,
95% CI [-4.79, -4.33]) and antiheroes (b = −2.08, SE = 0.12, t(1184) = −17.74, p < .001, r =
0.46, 95% CI [-2.31, -1.85]), and they rated the villains as more “bad” than both the heroes (b =
−4.61, SE = 0.12, t(1187) = −37.12, p < .001, r = 0.73, 95% CI [-4.85, -4.37]) and the antiheroes
(b = −2.47, SE = 0.12, t(1184) = −20.08, p < .001, r = 0.50, 95% CI [-2.71, -2.23]).
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Self-reported Interest
When we entered Moral Status Type as the predictor and self-reported interest as the
outcome into a mixed-effects model, results suggested a significant difference among the three
groups. Moral heroes were rated as more interesting than villains (b= −0.58, SE = 0.12, t(1179) =
−4.81, p < .001, r = 0.14, 95% CI [-0. 82, -0.35]) and antiheroes (b= −0.30, SE = 0.12, t(1179) =
−2.49, p = .013, r = 0.07, 95% CI [-0. 54, -0.06]).
Interestingness of antiheroes
We used a generalized mixed effects models with subjects and stimulus included as
random effects to test whether morally ambiguous characters lead to more “learn” trials in the
binary choice task. As predicted, participants selected the “learn” deck significantly more for
antiheroes compared to heroes, b = −0.35, SE = 0.17, z = −2.06, p = .039, OR = 1.45, 95% CI
[0.01, 0.72], davg = .20 (see Figure 5). However, we found no significant differences between
antiheroes and villains (b = 0.01, p =.94, 95% CI [−0.34, 0.35]). This pattern remained
unchanged when we included all participants who knew the characters in analyses, b = 0.42, p =
.025.

Figure 5. Actual predicted probabilities for deck choice by character type (moral ambiguity,
moral good, moral bad, respectively). Error bars represent 95% Confidence intervals.
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Discussion
In the pilot experiment, we found the predicted pattern of results: The “Learn” deck,
which revealed moral information about the characters was greater for antiheroic characters
compared to heroes. This pattern was stronger when only looking at the trials where participants
were familiar with the character. However, there was no significant difference between
antiheroes and villains. It is noteworthy that ambiguity and badness are more closely linked and
elicit more explanation-seeking than goodness. We take this difference as evidence that the basic
assumption that people seek moral goodness is not always true (see also Pizarro & Baumeister,
2013).
Another important pattern to note is general pattern of low rates of “Learn” deck
selection. There are a few reasons this pattern may have emerged. One reason is that the
“Describe” deck offers an image of the fictional character, many of whom are famous, attractive
actors. Participants may have been more inclined to see these familiar and attractive faces. This
may have also contributed to the differences evidenced between good and the other two Moral
Status Types. The actors cast to play heroes tend to be conventionally attractive, which may have
driven participants to select the “Describe” deck more often than the other two types. Another
reason we might see the “Describe” deck emerge as the default is that this deck may be easier—
reading factual information does not require a create deal of cognitive engagement. As such, it
may be experienced as easier compared to the other deck. If this is the case, the selection of the
morally bad and morally ambiguous characters is even more impressive—this interpretation
implies that the curiosity to gain access to explanation information is strong enough to overcome
the desire to find the easy way out in an online survey setting. Overall, this pilot provides

41
preliminary evidence that antiheroes are more interesting than morally good characters but may
not be more interesting than bad characters20.
2.2 Experiment 1a: Exploring curiosity for moral character of novel individuals with social
cues to moral status
Our daily experiences with morality, reflected in the entertainment we are drawn to
illustrate the allure of moral information. The pilot experiment provided preliminary evidence of
this framework—finding evidence of the allure of morally ambiguous and critically, of morally
bad others’ minds. It is noteworthy that ambiguity and badness are more closely linked and elicit
more motivation to learn about the minds of others across experiments than moral goodness. We
took this difference as evidence that the basic assumption that people seek moral goodness is not
always true (see also Pizarro & Baumeister, 2013), providing new insight into the seemingly
paradoxical delight of morally bad things.
Experiment 1a aimed to replicate and extend the pilot to establish that individuals find
morally ambiguous and bad information attracting and interesting to think about. That is,
Experiment 1a tested whether the same patterns emerge when using people who are unfamiliar
and matched on attractiveness (i.e., not exceptionally attractive like many of the heroes in the
pilot were). This would provide strong evidence that runs contrary to many theories of morality
if moral badness does not unilaterally spark disengagement, avoidance, or withdrawal.

20

However, as noted in the introduction, many characters in film and television are not seen as realistic, and
therefore may not be as aversive as a real-life evil person. I imagine that there are three patterns for interest
depending on moral information: For the morally good, the more morally good they are, the less interesting––a
linear relationship. For moral badness, I imagine that there’s a scaled cubic relationship between badness and
interest such that as badness increasing, so too does interest, up to some point. After that point is reached, more
badness drops interest down into a trough that levels off and stabilizes. Lastly, for moral ambiguity, I imagine a
classic U-shaped curve. As ambiguity goes up, so too does interest until some peak is reached after which interest
falls as incoherence (i.e., completely uncategorizable behavior or motive) takes over.
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It was hypothesized that participants will choose the “learn” deck most often for ambiguous
people compared to the unambiguously good, and potentially bad ones. Despite the results of the
pilot experiment, we are agnostic to whether participants will also find moral badness more
interesting than moral goodness. This is because the selected morally bad characters used in the
pilot were familiar characters that likely did not reach the “realism” necessary to engage
psychologically distancing cognitions. Moreover, if this same pattern is replicated, it will
nonetheless provide evidence for the claim that people do not solely seek to avoid moral badness.
Instead, moral badness can pique our interest and draw us in for further investigation inasmuch
as it is still “palatable” (e.g., disgusting content may initiate a withdrawal response).
Finally, the moral worldbuilding framework predicts that individuals should differ in what
prompts moral curiosity. Dispositions, learning, and more should contribute to variation in the
boundaries of what counts as good, bad, interesting, or uninteresting. As such, we also sought to
examine whether relevant dispositions affect preferences for Moral Status Type. Specifically, we
tested whether morbid curiosity, need for cognition, need for consistency, or essentialism
moderate task selection. Morbid curiosity captures a disposition to find highly intense bad things
as interesting (Oosterwijk, 2017; Scrivner, 2021). Interest in both morally bad and ambiguous
individuals should be related to morbid curiosity—individuals high in this should be drawn to the
bad parts of these people. Need for cognition is the tendency to enjoy thinking (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982). Ambiguous people require more cognitive engagement because they require
categorization. Thus, people who enjoy thinking should be more likely to select the explanationseeking “Learn” deck for ambiguous people compared to good and bad characters. We also
included a measure of consistency and good and evil essentialism as exploratory measures.
People who hold essentialist beliefs are more likely to endorse stereotypes (Bastian & Haslam,

43
2006). Similarly, those who essentialize good and evil may be more driven to reconcile and
categorize moral ambiguity than those who do not. A need for consistency may also enhance
curiosity for moral ambiguity by making it more salient. Altogether, each of these dispositions
capture an aspect of one’s personal worldview that may shape how they interact with and
understand moral information.
Method
Design
We used the same basic design as in the pilot. A fully within-subjects design with 3
levels for Moral Status Type (morally good, bad, and ambiguous) was used. All participants saw
thirty names and made a deck decision about those names. We also included deck color as a
single between-subjects variable. For half of the participants, the “Describe” deck was blue and
“Learn” deck was red, and for the other half of participants this was flipped. Deck color had no
effect on results and will not be discussed further.
Participants
Data collection began online using the student subject pool at Brooklyn College and
Queens College during the Spring 2019 semester in exchange for course credit. Due to COVID19, the student subject pool was shut down. An a priori power analysis based on the pilot was
conducted using PANGEA (Westfall, 2016) to accommodate the multi-level nature of the model
using a small to medium effect size of d = .28. The power analysis suggested 270 participants
was required that to achieve power of about 0.80, with alpha set to 0.05. We collected additional
consenting participants online using Prolific (accounting for about a 15% attention check failure
rate). The only inclusion criterion for Prolific data collection was current United States residence
and a 95% or higher rating on Prolific. Prolific participants were paid $3.40 on average for their
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participation and students participated in exchange for course credit. We recruited a total of 266
participants (82 from Queens College, 34 from Brooklyn College, and 150 from Prolific). We
conducted our analyses on a final sample of 218 participants (Mage = 24.02, SDage = 7.28, Male =
55, Female = 148, Other = 15) after removing participants who failed preregistered attention and
comprehension checks (N = 38). Additionally, we tested for, but did not find, any statistical
differences between the different samples and do not discuss them further.
Materials
Deck Decision Task
The same deck decision task from the pilot was used with two changes. First, the names
presented to participants were selected at random from a list of popular names in the United
States (e.g., John Williams). Second, to manipulate whether a random name was good, bad, or
ambiguous, we told participants that a group of previous participants rated the actions of each of
the people they were shown. We made those ratings into a slider scale that indicated that the
person was rated good, bad, or ambiguous on average by those independent raters (see Figure 6).
If a participant selected “Describe”, they would see a neutral expression from a White male face
selected from the Chicago Face Database (CFD; Ma et al., 2015) and matched on trustworthiness
and attractiveness (see Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009)21. If a participant selected the “Learn” deck,
they would see the moral actions of the person that lead to the categorization.

In a pilot experiment (Pilot S1 in Appendix B), we validated this task. Self-reported curiosity predicted “Learn”
deck choice, b = 0.04, SE = 0.002, t(9794) = 17.62, p < .001, r = 0.18.
21
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Figure 6. Example images of the moral status manipulation (morally good, ambiguous, and bad,
respectively).
Moral Status Type Stimuli
Thirty first and last names were selected from a list of common United States names. Full
list is available in Appendix A. These names were combined using a random list and adjusted if
the random pairing created a familiar name (e.g., Peter Jackson changed to Peter Johnson).
Manipulation Checks
Participants made the same manipulation check judgments in Experiment 1a as in the pilot
experiment. They were asked to indicate how bad and how good the character they learned about
(or saw) was following each decision in the main experimental task.
Self-reported Interest
We again measured self-reported interest for each person. We asked participants “How
interesting is this person?” on a trial level, again rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all to 9 =
Extremely.
Self-reported Identification
We also measured self-reported identification at the trial level. We asked participants “Do
you feel as though this person is like you?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all like me to 9 =
Very much like me.
Individual Difference Measures
Morbid Curiosity. Six items were selected from the Morbid Curiosity Scale (MSC;
Scrivner, 2021). This shortened scale was used to measure the extent to which individuals are
attracted to dangerous or unpleasant things. A representative item is: “I am curious about the
minds of violent people,” rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree. Based on the
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high internal reliability, a single MSC variable was created by collapsing across the six items (α
= 0.88). The full list of the selected items is available in Appendix A.
Need for Cognition. We included the Need for Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty,
1982; 1984; Cacciopio et al., 2013) to measure dispositional tendency to enjoy thinking.
Previous research also has found a strong positive correlation between general measures of
curiosity and NFC (Olson et al., 1984). Representative items include “I prefer my life to be filled
with puzzles I must solve”, and “The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top
appeals to me”, rated from 1 = extremely uncharacteristic of me to 9 = extremely characteristic
of me. a single We created a single NFC variable by collapsing across the six items (α = 0.88).
Single item Need for Consistency. We also included the single item Need for
Consistency item (Nichols & Webster, 2014). The item is “I make an effort to appear consistent
to others,” rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 9 = strongly agree.
Evil Essentialism. Essentialism of good and evil was measured by adapting a measure of
gender essentialism (Skewes et al., 2018) to refer to “good” and “evil” people rather than “men”
and “women”. A representative sample item is “Differences between good and evil people are
primarily determined by biology”, rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. This
measure also had high internal reliability and was collapsed into a single variable (α = 0.79). The
full list of the items is available in Appendix A.
Procedure
The procedure mirrored that of the pilot experiment. On each trial, participants were shown
the two decks to select from, the name, and a slider scale in random order. For both decks,
participants were also asked to write two keywords that describe the information they were
shown and then answer questions about their interest, how good and bad, and how much they

47
identified with each of the selected targets. Participants completed 30 trials of the deck task in
random order—ten that were rated good (akin to heroes), ten that were rated ambiguous (akin to
antiheroes), and ten that were rated bad (akin to villains). After completion of the main
experimental procedure, participants completed individual difference measures and
demographics questions. Finally, participants were debriefed and provided credit or paid for their
participation.
Results
To analyze whether interest is greater for the morally ambiguous compared to the
unambiguous faces, we again used the lme4 package from R (R Core Team, 2019; Bates et al.,
2015). All models use Satterthwaite approximation to calculate degrees of freedom. We
preregistered running two mixed-effects models: One generalized mixed-effects model with
participants and stimuli entered as random effects and Moral Status Type as the predictor, and
another with the same specification but including self-identification as a covariate. We also used
a linear mixed-effects model to test whether Moral Status Type predicts self-reported interest
(above and beyond self-identification). For both models, conclusions remain unchanged with the
addition of the covariate and so we report the model that includes self-identification only. Each
model includes by-participant random slopes and intercepts.
Manipulation Check
Results suggested that the manipulation was successful. Participants rated the good Moral
Status Type people are more morally good than both the ambiguous, b = 1.48, SE = 0.07, t(214)
= 20.56, p < .001, r = 0.81, 95% CI [1.34, 1.62], and bad, b = 2.89, SE = 0.11, t(216) = 26.92, p
< .001, r = 0.88, 95% CI [2.67, 3.09] moral people.
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Additionally, the bad Moral Status Type people were rated as more morally bad than both
the morally good, b = 2.76, SE = 0.11, t(216) = 24.93, p < .001, r = 0.86, 95% CI [2.55, 2.98]
and the morally ambiguous, b = 1.22, SE = 0.07, t(213) = 16.68, p < .001, r = 0.75, 95% CI
[1.08, 1.36] people.
Self-reported interest
When we entered self-reported interest as the outcome variable, the results mirrored that
of the pilot experiment. Participants report that morally good individuals are more interesting
than ambiguous, b = 0.72, SE = 0.08, t(212) = 9.48, p < .001, r = 0.55, 95% CI [0.57, 0.86] and
bad people, b = 1.34, SE = 0.11, t(215) = 12.44, p < .001, r = 0.65, 95% CI [1.13, 1.55].
Moral Curiosity
Next, we tested the target relationship, using a slightly different specification than the
other models. We used ‘glmer’ to accommodate the binary nature of the variable and along with
the random intercept for participants, we included by-participant random slopes to test which
Moral Status Type sparked the most curiosity. Moral Status Type was entered as a fixed effect,
and identification as a covariate (pattern of results remains consistent when excluding
identification and when excluding random slopes). Overall, results partially supported
predictions. As predicted, morally ambiguous individuals lead to significantly more explanationseeking curiosity than morally good individuals, b = 0.25, SE = 0.08, z = 3.09, p = .002, r = 0.07,
95% CI [0.21, 0.61], OR = 1.29. However, morally bad targets elicited significantly more
explanation-seeking curiosity than both the ambiguous and good types. Bad targets lead to more
“Learn” deck choices compared to both ambiguous individuals, b = 0.64, SE = 0.09, z = 6.90, p <
.001, r = 0.17, 95% CI [0.46, 0.83], OR = 1.90, and good individuals, b = 0.90, SE = 0.10, z =
9.23, p < .001, r = 0.24, 95% CI [0.71, 1.09], OR = 2.45 (see Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Probability of choosing the “Learn” deck for each of the Moral Status Types. Error
bars represent 95% Confidence intervals. This model includes identification as a covariate, byparticipant random slopes and random intercepts.
Individual differences
In an exploratory manner, we also explored the influence of individual differences on
explanation-seeking curiosity (see Table 1 for correlations individual difference among
variables). For each individual difference trait, we ‘glmer’ specified a separate model that
included the trait and the Moral Status Type as predictors as well as their interaction term to
predict “Learn” deck choice.
Table 1. Correlations among individual difference traits.
Measure
1
1. Morbid Curiosity
-2. Evil Essentialism
.04**
3. Need for Cognition
.09***
4. Need for Consistency
.06***
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

2

3

4

--.24***
.18**

--.03*

--

50

For Morbid Curiosity, there was no significant interaction between the trait and Moral
Status Type. The marginal main effect of Morbid Curiosity was itself a significant predictor of
“Learn” Deck choice suggesting that curiosity, even of the morbid variety, indeed predicts more
engagement with the minds of others, b = 0.28, SE = 0.10, z = 2.78, p = .005, r = 0.08, 95% CI
[0.08, 0.48]. There were no statistically significant effects for the Need for Cognition or Evil
Essentialism models.
Interestingly, there was a significant interaction between Need for Consistency and Moral
Status Type on moral deck choice, but in the opposite direction of what was expected. People
high in need for consistency were more likely to select the “Learn” deck for morally bad targets,
b = 0.11, SE = 0.05, z = 2.09, p = .037, r = 0.03 compared to morally ambiguous people. The
direction of the morally good effect, though non-significant, was also in the opposite direction of
what was expected, b = 0.08, SE = 0.05, z = 1.76, p = .078, r = 0.02.
Discussion
Overall, Experiment 1a provided mixed evidence for our predictions. Moral ambiguity
stemming from conflicting judgments about individuals lead to more moral curiosity than
morally good people, but they were significantly less likely to prompt moral motive seeking
behavior than morally bad individuals. Mirroring previous research (Krakowiak & Oliver, 2012),
we found that self-reported interest again predicted the opposite pattern of results. Participants
self-reported being most interested in morally good others, which again points to the selfmonitored nature of morality. Our behavioral results suggest that asking directly who people are
interested in may not be an effective strategy for studying morality. Morality is central to our
self-concept and self-image (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; Strohminger et al., 2017), and is
therefore subject to self-presentation biases.
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The results of the deck task in this experiment suggest that the images of famous characters
may have contributed to the overall preference for “Describe” deck choices. Here, when the
information available is either a moderately attractive individual or an explanation for why they
were categorized in the way that they were, we see that the baseline is not nearly as skewed
toward “Describe”. Instead, people seemed to prefer distinct kinds of information for the distinct
moral categories, with ambiguous moral minds falling somewhere between the two extremes.
This experiment provides evidence for the claim that moral curiosity prompts engagement—
rather than reveal easily digestible information (i.e., “Describe” deck), participants preferred the
more cognitively engaging information for immoral or ambiguous others.
However, it is still not clear how people interpret moral ambiguity or why they are drawn
to immorality. First, moral ambiguity can mean several different things—ambiguity in actions,
character, consensus, or extremity. Looking to the characters that draw in our attention and
interest in TV and cinema (e.g., Tony Soprano), their ambiguity seems to stem primarily from
their conflicting actions. That is, Tony Soprano is likely thought to have bad moral character by
most, but his actions and moral violations nonetheless draw in interest. In the next experiment,
we focus in on ambiguity that is elicited by committing both good and bad moral actions and
compare that to actions that are only good or bad. We also explore whether it is the extremity of
the immoral people, rather than the valence or ambiguity of them, that drives moral curiosity.
2.2 Experiment 1b: Exploring curiosity for moral character of novel individuals with moral
action information
Experiment 1b aimed to manipulate moral ambiguity in a different way and again explore
whether moral ambiguity and moral badness lead to greater explanation-seeking curiosity.
Experiment 1a used a manipulation that suggested people were conflicted about the moral status
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of an ambiguous person. In this experiment, we created ambiguity by directly varying the kinds
of actions people committed, giving people access to a more direct source of moral information.
We also sought to examine the role of normality. Previous research shows that morally
good and morally ambiguous characters are seen as similarly realistic (Krakowiak & Oliver,
2012). Given the pattern of findings in the first two experiments, it is possible that people are
most curious about moral badness because it represents the most deviant moral category. Like
villains, bad guys are strange and not often encountered. People expect others to be morally good
(Siegel et al., 2018), and so moral badness piques interest because it deviates from that baseline
expectation (and moral ambiguity falls somewhere in the middle). Indeed, morally bad actions
tend to be judged as diagnostic of individual character precisely because they are abnormal
(Mende-Siedlecki et al., 2013). As such, we included exploratory measures of normativity from
work by Bear and Knobe (2017). Their work suggests that what is seen as normal is a function of
what is average and what is ideal. We measure both of those judgments in this experiment to
examine whether moral curiosity tracks moral deviance.
To better understand the function of moral curiosity, we included measures of perceived
learning (see also Liquin & Lombrozo, 2022) and explored whether judgments about the fit of
encountered information with individuals’ understanding of their moral worlds revealed insight
into the triggers of moral curiosity. Finally, we also examined whether participants found one
deck to be more fun or more difficult than the other.
We predicted that moral ambiguity would again pique more moral curiosity than moral
goodness. We also predicted that moral badness would elicit more moral curiosity than moral
goodness. We were again agnostic to whether ambiguity and moral badness would stimulate
different levels of curiosity. We had no a priori predictions about the exploratory variables.
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Method
Design
The design matched that of Experiment 1a but used a different manipulation of moral
status. Instead of manipulating moral status by consensus of others’ judgments, we manipulated
it by classifying individuals’ actions. All participants again saw thirty names and made a deck
decision about those names. We also asked questions about curiosity, self-identification,
learning, and normativity on a participant, rather than trial, level.
Participants
We recruited a total of 335 participants from Prolific with the goal of preserving a sample
size of about 270 to match the power analysis from Experiment 1a. After excluding people who
failed attention (N = 4), bot (N =1), and manipulation comprehension (N = 4) checks and those
with non-variance in deck choice responding (N = 81), we conducted analyses on a final sample
of 245 participants (Mage = 35.04, SDage = 12.60, Male = 121, Female = 129, Other = 6).
Mirroring Experiment 1a, the only inclusion criterion for Prolific data collection was current
United States residence and 95% or higher rating on Prolific. Prolific participants were paid
$3.37 on average for their participation.
Materials
Deck Decision Task
The same deck decision task from the Experiment 1a was used with one change. To
manipulate Moral Status Type, we told participants that we fed a computer algorithm the actions
reported by a separate sample of people. The algorithm then categorized each of those actions as
either morally good or morally bad. 10 people’s actions were all rated as morally good (akin to a
hero), 10 people’s actions were all rated as morally bad (akin to a villain), and half of the actions
were rated as good and half as bad for the morally ambiguous people (see Figure 8). To visualize
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this, we color coded the two types of actions and plotted on a single line with the anchors “good”
and “bad”. Morally good actions were indicated by pink dots and clustered on the right-hand
side of the graph. Morally bad actions were indicated by blue dots and clustered on the left-hand
side of the graph. Labels on either side of the graph remained visible during the duration of the
trial as a reminder. As in Experiment 1a, if a participant selected “Describe”, they would see a
neutral expression from a White male face (CFD; Ma et al., 2015) that was matched on
trustworthiness and attractiveness (see Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009). If participants selected the
“Learn” deck, they would see a short description of the moral motives of the classified
individual. This was the primary dependent variable for Experiment 1b.

Morally Good

Morally Ambiguous

Morally Bad

Figure 8. Example images of the moral status manipulation (morally good, ambiguous, and bad,
respectively).
Moral Status Type Stimuli
The same thirty names from Experiment 1a were used and randomly matched to
distribution stimuli. Distributions were created by simulating data in R. Each distribution had
equivalent total N, variance, and absolute value of the average.
Individual Difference Measures
Morbid Curiosity. The same six items from the Morbid Curiosity Scale (MSC; Scrivner,
2021) were used. These items were again collapsed into a single MSC variable (α = .93). The full
list of the selected items is available in Appendix A.
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Need for Cognition. The Need for Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982;
Cacciopio et al., 2013) was also used and collapsed into a single index (α = .94). The full list of
the items is available in Appendix A.
Exploratory measures
Normality judgments. To assess normativity, we asked participants how average and
how ideal they found each of the three Moral Status Types on a participant-level, rated on a scale
from 1 = Not at all [average/ideal] to 9 = Extremely [average/ideal].
Self-reported curiosity. Given that the patterns of self-reported interest ran counter to
the behavioral findings, here we included self-reported curiosity instead to see if the results
remained the same, or if it instead matched the decision task. We asked participants “How
curious are you about people whose actions are categorized like this?” on a participant level for a
single representative person from each of the three categories, rated on a scale from 1 = Not at
all curious to 9 = Extremely curious. That is, participants answered three questions only about
self-reported curiosity—one for each of the moral types.
Self-reported Identification. On a participant-level we asked participants how much
they felt each of the three Moral Status Types were similar to them. Participants were asked, “Do
you feel as though this person is like you?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all like me to 9 =
Very much like me.
Perceived learning. We also measured perceived learning on a participant level as it
related to the two deck choices for additional validation of our operationalization. These items
were adapted from Liquin and Lombrozo (2022). We asked participants about how broad,
pattern like, and relevant to human nature the information gained from each deck was. A
representative item is “When you chose the [LEARN/DESCRIBE] deck, to what extent did you
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think you would learn something narrow (only applies to this person) vs. broad (might apply to
more people)?”. All three items were rated on a nine-point scale.
Fit and imagination. We also measured judgments of worldview fit and ease of
imagining for each of the three Moral Status Types on a participant-level. For the worldview fit
question, we asked, “How well does a person categorized like this fit into your current beliefs
about the world?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all to 9 = Extremely well. For the imagination
question, we asked, “How easily can you imagine a world that has no people whose actions
would be categorized like this?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all easy to imagine to 9 =
Extremely easy to imagine.
Procedure
Consenting participants answered a series of comprehension checks to ensure that they
understood the distributions. Participants saw a distribution that corresponded to either a good
person (actions all clustered around good), a bad person (actions all clustered around bad), or an
ambiguous person (some bad and some good actions) on each trial and were then asked to select
between the “Describe” deck and “Learn” decks. Here again, the “Describe” deck yielded
information about the appearance of the person whose actions were categorized, and the “Learn”
deck revealed their moral motivations and backstory. Participants made decisions for 30
distributions (10 of each Moral Status Type). Next, we asked participants about the normality of
each of the Moral Status Types, worldview fit, and perceptions of learning. Participants then
completed demographics questions, the same six items from the Morbid Curiosity Scale (MSC)
and the Need for Cognition scale (NFC), and then they were debriefed.
Results
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We used the same general analysis strategy as in Experiment 1a. We used a generalized
mixed-effects model with participants and stimuli entered as random effects and Moral Status
Type as the predictor to test for differences in deck selection. We also ran an additional
generalized mixed-effects model with the same specification but including self-identification
with each of the moral types as covariates. This model led to the same pattern of results.
Participants who failed attention checks or did not understand the distributions after three rounds
of instructions were excluded from analyses (as preregistered) 22.
Moral Curiosity
We first tested whether people were more curious to learn about the moral motives of
ambiguous people compared to those that were categorized as bad or good. To test this, we fit a
series of mixed-effects regression models each with by-participant random intercepts and Moral
Status factor as a fixed effect. Using the simplest specification 23, we found that participants
selected the “Learn” deck more often for bad compared to ambiguous others, b = 0.18, SE =
0.06, z = 3.02, p = .003, r = 0.05, 95% CI [0.06, 0.30], OR = 1.20, and for good compared to
ambiguous others, b = 0.14, SE = 0.06, z = 2.30, p = .021, r = 0.04, 95% CI [0.26, 0.02] , OR =
1.15. People were most likely to select the “Learn” deck, revealing the moral motives for
individuals categorized as bad (i.e., villains; see Figure 9), but were also more likely to reveal the
inner motives of morally good individuals as well. There were no significant differences between
morally good and morally bad character types.

22

These models do not include self-identification as a covariate (which was included in the previous studies)
because it was measured on a participant- rather than trial- level. Participants rated themselves as least similar to the
morally bad individuals (b = −3.25, SE = 0.17, t(765) = −19.53, p < .001, r = 0.58), but there were no statistically
significant differences between morally good and morally ambiguous.
23
When using a more complex specification (e.g., including random slopes), there are no significant differences.
However, the model is singular with that specification and so I only report the simple model here.
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Figure 9. Probability of choosing the “Learn” deck for each of the Moral Status Types. Error
bars represent 95% Confidence intervals.
Individual differences
Next, we tested whether the individual difference traits (MCS and NFC) influenced deck
choice in two separate models. For both of those models, we created an interaction term that
included the z-scored participant-level individual difference score and the Moral Status factor
and included random slopes of the individual difference trait. Neither NFC or MCS were
significant predictors, p’s > .07.
Exploratory measures
For each of the exploratory measures, unless otherwise noted, we fit mixed-effects
regression models with by-participant random intercepts and entered Moral Status as a fixed
effect.
Normality
First, we tested the normality judgments for each of the Moral Status Types. Results
revealed that ambiguous individuals were seen as most average compared to good, b = 2.84, SE
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= 0.18, t(488) = 15.71, p < .001, r = 0.58, 95% CI [3.19, 2.48], and bad individuals, b = 3.71, SE
= 0.18, t(488) = 20.54, p < .001, r = 0.68, 95% CI [4.06, 3.36].
For the ideal judgments, the ICC for the grouping variable (participant) did not exceed a
minimum cut-off of .10. As such, we used Ordinary Least Squares regression to test for
differences in ideal judgments. We found that good individuals were rated as more ideal than
both ambiguous, b = 2.70, SE = 0.16, t(732) = 16.49, p < .001, r = 0.52, 95% CI [2.38, 3.02] and
bad, b = 5.70, SE = 0.16, t(732) = 34.86, p < .001, r = 0.79, 95% CI [5.38, 6.02]. Ambiguous
individuals were also seen as more ideal than bad individuals, b = 3.00, SE = 0.16, t(732) =
18.37, p < .001, r = 0.56, 95% CI [2.68, 3.33] (see Figure 10).

Ambiguous

Good

Bad

Ambiguous
Ambiguous

Good

Bad
Bad

Figure 10. Average and ideal judgments for each Moral Status Type. The thick black line in the
boxes represents the mean, and the edges represent standard errors.
Self-reported curiosity
Self-reported curiosity tracked moral goodness. Participants rated morally good people as
more curiosity inciting than both morally bad (b = 0.51, SE = 0.19, t(488) = 2.75, p = .006, r =
0.12, 95% CI [0.15, 0.87]) and morally ambiguous others (b = 1.27, SE = 0.19, t(488) = 6.83, p <
.001, r = 0.30, 95% CI [0.90, 1.63]). Participants also reported more curiosity for the morally
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ambiguous targets compared to the morally bad ones, b = 0.76, SE = 0.19, t(488) = 4.08, p <
.001, r = 0.18, 95% CI [0.39, 1.12].
Self-reported identification
For self-reported identification, the clustering for by-participant random slope was not high
enough (ICC <0.10), so we used OLS regression to test for differences among Moral Status
Type. Self-reported identification was higher from morally ambiguous than bad targets (b = 3.15,
SE = 0.17, t(732) = 18.60, p < .001, r = 0.57, 95% CI [2.81, 3.48]), but not different than morally
good ones (p = 0.72, 95% CI [–0.27, 0.39]). Morally good targets were also rated as more similar
to participants than morally bad ones, b = 3.21, SE = 0.17, t(732) = 18.96, p < .001, r = 0.57,
95% CI [2.88, 3.54].
Fit and imagination
To better understand individual worldviews, we also explored whether people whose
actions were categorized as morally ambiguous differ from those that are morally certain in
terms of worldview fit and ease of imagination. Results partially supported this notion. The ICC
was again too low for mixed-effects modeling, and so we used OLS regression here. Participants
rated people whose actions were morally ambiguous as fitting better in their worldview than both
morally good, b = 0.96, SE = 0.15, t(732) = 6.43, p < .001, r = 0.23, 95% CI [0.67, 1.26], and
morally bad others, b = 1.96, SE = 0.15, t(732) = 13.10, p < .001, r = 0.44, 95% CI [1.67, 2.26].
Looking to ease of imagination we found evidence that participants found morally ambiguous
people easier to imagine than morally good people, b = 0.50, SE = 0.20, t(730) = 2.50, p = .013, r
= 0.09, 95% CI [0.11, 0.89], but we did not find statistically significant differences with morally
bad others, b = 0.31, SE = 0.20, p = .13 (see Figure 11).
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Ambiguous

Good

Bad

Ambiguous

Good

Bad

Figure 11. Exploratory measures of worldview fit and ease of imagination for each Moral Status
Type. The thick black line in the boxes represents the mean, and the edges represent standard
errors.
Perceived learning
We included an exploratory analysis of perceived learning from each deck to validate the
task. We used OLS regression to test for differences between the two decks. Results suggested
that the “Learn” deck provided significantly more learning opportunity than the “Describe” deck.
Participants rated the “Learn” as broader, b = 0.58, SE = 0.26, t(488) = 2.23, p = .026, r = 0.10,
95% CI [0.07, 1.08], revealing more patterns, b = 2.65, SE = 0.20, t(488) = 13.21, p < .001, r =
0.65, 95% CI [2.26, 3.05], and more informative about human nature, b = 2.89, SE = 0203,
t(488) = 14.41, p < .001, r = 0.55, 95% CI [2.50, 3.28] than the “Describe” deck.
Discussion
We found mixed support for our hypotheses. Again, morally bad individuals emerged as
most interesting. Even though participants rated them as the least ideal and least average, it is the
minds of the bad guys that we are most curious about understanding their motives. Contrary to
predictions, we also found that morally good people elicited more moral curiosity than morally
ambiguous ones. This was unexpected and likely due to the change to action categorization of
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the manipulation. Rather than people being rated as good by others (which is normative),
someone’s whose actions are all categorized as good is exceptionally morally good—they are
moral deviants but are akin to moral saints rather than villains. The normativity judgments
support this interpretation. Morally good people were seen as most ideal, but they were also seen
as less average than the morally ambiguous individuals. And although morally ambiguous minds
did not spark curiosity to the degree that we predicted, we found that people see their worlds as
mostly consisting of people who do both morally good and bad things—they are hard to imagine
a world without, fit within worldviews, and rated as average. As such, we may have
inadvertently created a morally ambiguous person who is more like an “average Joe” than they
are a Dexter Morgan (from the show Dexter, police employee and serial killer) or Tony Soprano
(from the show The Sopranos, mob boss, murderer, and loyal friend). Therefore, participants
may have seen the normality of those individuals as more boring than those who deviate from
normal moral behavior.
We also set out to better understand how participants approach the deck task. As such, we
included questions about how fun and difficult the decks were. Participants could select either of
the decks or indicate that they were equal. Interestingly, while the majority (54%) of participants
reported that the “Learn” deck was most fun, 86% reported that it was also the more difficult
deck. This suggests that the default choice is likely the “Describe” deck, and it is curiosity for the
minds of others that can push people to engage with the more difficult deck. This pattern also
suggests that other factors like empathy may be playing a role (see Cameron et al., 2019). In the
next experiment, we shift focus to better understanding ambiguity, opportunity for learning, and
examine whether other traits like empathy and imaginative resistance may better capture
dispositions relevant to moral worldbuilding.
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CHAPTER III
Examining the links between moral curiosity and actual learning
Experiment 2
So far, we have found mixed evidence for the moral worldbuilding approach. The first set
of experiments suggested that people are curious for explanations about morally bad individuals,
regardless of the kind of manipulation that is used. In contrast, curiosity for moral ambiguity is
sensitive to the manipulation used. Indeed, when morally ambiguity was manipulated using
social cues to character judgments, we saw the predicted pattern of results—participants more
frequently selected the “Learn” deck than they did for morally good people. This pattern fits well
with other research on the influence of social information on curiosity. For example, when
people are given information about the popularity of answers to question, people are more likely
to reveal the answers that have high popularity (Dubey et al., 2021). When we manipulated
moral ambiguity via the categorization of actions, we saw a different pattern of results emerge.
People were more likely to select the “Learn” deck for the two categories that weren’t normal—
morally good and morally bad.
Experiment 2 had two primary aims. The first goal of Experiment 2 was to better
understand how normativity might influence preferences. To this end, we included a morally
average category in Experiment 2 to see whether social signals of averageness spark curiosity in
a way similar to (or different from) moral ambiguity. The second aim of Experiment 2 was to
examine the role that moral curiosity plays in learning, and test additional individual differences
that may shed light on which dispositions contribute to moral curiosity for ambiguous and bad
targets. Moral Worldbuilding predicts that curiosity should be directed toward uncovering insight
into the moral domain. This function mirrors that of domain general curiosity. Research suggests
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curiosity is tuned to expected reward and learning (Kobayashi et al., 2019). Thus, when people
feel more morally curious, they should also expect to learn more and feel satisfied. To test this,
we modified a framework used by Dubey et al. (2021) that breaks the information-seeking into
multiple parts: a decision, curiosity and confidence judgments, and judgments about satisfaction
and perceived learning. Additionally, previous research suggests that curiosity predicts perceived
learning, and is a better indicator of perceived rather than actual learning (Liquin & Lombrozo,
2022). As such, we also included a memory task at the end of the study to assess whether moral
curiosity predicts both perceived and actual learning.
Method
Design
The design was similar to that of Experiment 1a and 1b, but it included three phases on
each of the individual trials, and it included morally average as an additional moral status
grouping. We again used a fully within-in subjects design to examine the effect of moral status
(morally ambiguous, morally good, morally bad, or morally average) on curiosity. We used the
slider scales from Experiment 1a to manipulate Moral Status Type in a four-option forced-choice
decision in phase 1 of the trial. Phase two of the trial asked participants about their predicted
judgments of the selected target. In phase three, the moral motive information of the selected
target was revealed, and participants made a series of judgments. Participants completed 10
trials.
Participants
We preregistered our recruitment goal and exclusion criteria. We recruited a total of 310
participants from Prolific with the goal of preserving a sample size of about 270. Given the
reduction in trials, we conducted a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to detect an
effect of ω = 0.2. After excluding people who failed attention and instructions comprehension
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checks (N = 5), we conducted analyses on a final sample of 305 participants (Mage = 39.92, SDage
= 13.70, Male = 141, Female = 151, Other = 9). The inclusion criterion for Prolific data
collection was current United State residence, no participation in pilot studies related to this
experiment, 99% approval rating on Prolific, and a minimum of 5 submissions of Prolific.
Prolific participants were paid $3.04 on average for their participation.
Materials
Phase 1
Moral Status Type Stimuli. We again selected first and last names from a list of
common United States names to use as the identifiers of the moral character manipulations. The
full list is available in Appendix A. There were forty total first and last name pairs selected and
yoked to a moral character slider manipulation. This manipulation matched that of Experiment
1a but included an additional grouping: morally average. As in Experiment 1a, the sliders
included a percentage to indicate agreement on the classification of the target. Those percentages
were matched in their mean and their standard deviation. An example of the slider stimuli is
presented in Table 2 below.
Decision Task. Here, we used a modified version of the decision task from Experiments
1a and 1b. Instead of having participants select the kind of information they would like about a
given character type, they instead selected which character type they would like for the moral
motive information. That is, we focused on one type of information: information available from
the “Learn” deck. We also hanged the structure of the task such that the decision task always
takes place at phase one of three phases. The two other phases ask for specific judgments about
selected targets and are described below. For the decision task, participants selected from names
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yoked to the moral status manipulation from Experiment 1a24 (see Table 2).
Phase 2
Curiosity. During phase two, participants indicated their curiosity for more information
about the selected target. We asked participants, “How curious are you to know more about this
person?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all curious to 7 = Extremely curious.
Confidence. Participants also indicated their confidence in their prediction about how the
selected person will be. We asked participants “If you had to guess what this person was like,
how confident would you be in that guess?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all confident to 7 =
Extremely confident.
Self-reported Interest and Identification. Participants answered questions about their
self-reported interest and identification at the trial level. Participants were asked, “How
interesting do you think this person is?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all interesting to 7 =
Extremely interesting to measure interest and “How similar to you do you think this person is?”
rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all like me to 7 = Very much like me to measure identification.
Expected Learning. Participants also indicated whether they believed they would gain
knowledge about human nature from learning about the selected target. They were asked, “How
much do you expect to learn about human nature from this person?” rated on a scale from 1 =
Nothing to 7 = A great deal.
Phase 3
Revealed moral information. In the final phase of the trial, participants are revealed
moral motive information about the target and an image of their face. These images were again

24

In a pilot experiment, we compared the average and ideal judgments for the average, ambiguous, good, and bad
slider manipulation and found that participants distinguish between the four types of sliders. This pilot data is
reported in the Appendix B.
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selected from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015), and matched on attractiveness, age,
and dominance (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2009). We also used LIWC to match the revealed
information on length and ensure that the written vignettes were adequately capturing the moral
character categories of interest25. The information revealed was either only good in nature
(morally good), only bad in nature (morally bad), both good and bad (morally ambiguous), or
mostly not moral in nature (morally average). An example is presented in Table 2 below.
Normality. We again measured how normal participants viewed the targets using
average and ideal judgments (Bear & Knobe, 2017). We measured these items in the same way
as in Experiment 1b.
Satisfaction. We also measured whether participants felt a sense of satisfaction after
seeing the information about the target. Participants were asked “4. How satisfying do you find
the information you learned about this person?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all to 7 =
Extremely.
Perceived Learning. Finally, we asked participants about how much they explicitly
thought they had learned as a function of better understanding the selected person. We asked
participants about the perceived utility, about the patterns revealed, and whether learning applies
narrowly or broadly. Each item was measured on a scale from 1 = Not at all [judgment] to 7 =
Extremely [judgment]. Wording for the individual learning items is listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Three phases of Experiment 2 and items rated at each stage.

25

Using the Moral Foundation Dictionary, we found that bad character vignettes were highest in care vice (most
harm language), and the good character vignettes were rated highest in care virtue (most care language). The
average and ambiguous vignettes fell in the middle with the ambiguous vignettes having equal care and harm
language and the average having slightly more care language than the ambiguous but also more harm language than
the good.
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Phase 1: Initial Decision

Phase 2: Predicted
Judgments

1. How curious are you to
know more about this
person?
2. If you had to guess what
this person was like, how
confident would you be
in that guess?
3. How interesting do you
think this person is?
4. How similar to you do
you think this person is?
5. How much do you
expect to learn about
human nature from this
person?

Phase 3: Actual Judgments

1. How average is this person?
2. How ideal is this person?
3. How satisfying do you find
the information you learned
about this person?
4. To what extent is the
information you learned
useful to you in the future?
5. Do you think the information
you learned helps reveal a
genuine pattern, structure, or
regularity about humanity?
6. Do you think the information
you learned is narrow (only
applies to the person you
learned about) or broad (also
applies to people in general)?

Individual Difference Measures
Morbid Curiosity. The same six items selected in Experiment 1a and 1b from the
Morbid Curiosity Scale (MSC; Scrivner, 2021) were used. These items were again collapsed into
a single MSC variable (α = .92). The full list of the selected items is available in Appendix A.
Need for Cognition. Participants completed a shortened form of the Need for Cognition
scale (NFC-short; Lins de Holanda Coehlo et al., 2020). Items were rated on a scale of 1 =
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Extremely uncharacteristic of me to 5 = Extremely characteristic of me. This measure was
collapsed into a single index (α = .93). The full list of the items is available in Appendix A.
Imaginative Resistance. We included three representative items from the Imaginative
Resistance Scale (Black & Barnes, 2017). A representative item is: “I would be uncomfortable
reading a book in which the protagonist thought it was okay to kill people.”, measured on a scale
from 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree. This exploratory measure was collapsed into a
single index (α = .83). The full list of the selected items is available in Appendix A.
Perspective Taking Empathy. We included three representative items from the
perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). A
representative item is: “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things
look from their perspective”, which was rated on a scale from 1 = Does not describe me well to 5
= Describes me very well. This exploratory measure was collapsed into a single index (α = .83).
The full list of the selected items is available in Appendix A.
General and Personal Belief in a Just World Scale. We also included Belief in a Just
World (Dalbert, 1999) as a measure of moral worldview. A representative sample item is “I think
basically the world is a just place”, rated from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree. This
measure also had high internal reliability and was collapsed into a single variable (α = .93). The
full list of the items is available in Appendix A.
Actual learning
To assess actual learning, we showed participants a series of 20 faces that were
comprised of faces seen in the 10 trials (regardless of selected Moral Status Type) and 10 new
faces. These faces were selected from the CFD (Ma et al., 2015), and the two groups (old vs.
new) were matched on attractiveness, age, and dominance. We also tried to select new faces
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which were similar in hair to the target old faces. As noted above, phase three in each of the ten
trials revealed moral motive information and an image of the target. This image was the same for
each of the moral targets for a given trial. In other words, if participants selected an ambiguous
slider on a trial, they would see the same face as someone who had select the bad slider for that
same trial (and so forth). To examine learning, we asked participants to indicate whether the 20
faces were new, meaning that they had never seen them before, or old, meaning that they were
faces previously seen in the 10 experimental trials. We elected to use the faces associated with
the moral information rather than the moral information itself because we assumed that
participants who engaged deeply with the content revealed would be most likely to remember
non-relevant features like the faces presented. If moral value helps us to amplify what we are
visually experiencing (Gantman & Van Bavel, 2015), then memory for those faces associated
with moral value that participants found interesting and engaging should be easiest to remember.
Procedure
After providing informed consent and passing comprehension checks for the instructions,
participants answered a series of 10 trials each with three phases (adapted from Dubey et al.,
2021). In phase one of each trial, participants made a single decision of which of the four present
Moral Status Types (average, good, bad, or ambiguous) they were interested in learning more
about. After making a selection, participants began phase two of the trial which consisted of a
series of questions (presented in randomized order) about the predicted attributes and learning
value of the chosen target. After completion of those questions, participants began phase three of
the trial in which participants were shown an image of the target and the moral motive
information associated with the chosen moral target. In this phase, participants answered the
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same questions about the normality (Bear & Knobe, 2017) of each of the Moral Status Types as
used in Experiment 1b, satisfaction and learning (presented in random order).
Next, we tested actual learning. Participants viewed one face at a time in completely
random order and were asked to indicate whether the face was new or old in a 2-choice forcedresponse task (20 total faces). Participants then completed the Morbid Curiosity Scale (MSC),
the Need for Cognition scale (NFC), the Belief in a Just World Scale, and demographics
questions. All participants were debriefed and paid for their time.
Results
Following the analysis strategy from Dubey et al. (2021), we analyzed the different
phases of the experiment separately. We used a multinomial mixed-effects model which
specified participants and stimuli as random effects to first examine preferences during the initial
decision. Next, we used linear mixed-effects models with participants entered as random effects
to compare the effects of Moral Status Type on the phase two predicted judgments. We will then
use linear mixed-effects models with participants entered as a random effect to test whether
differences in normality, learning, and satisfaction emerge among the different Moral Status
Types.
Phase One
Decision Task
To investigate whether participants selected one category more frequently than the others,
we first conducted a chi-square test for given probabilities. The omnibus test suggested that there
were statistically significant differences among the choice types, χ2 (3, N = 3,050) = 139.47, p <
0.00126 (see Figure 12). To investigate pairwise differences between the moral status targets, we

26

We also included two exploratory measures of ease and interest for the four selection options. Overall,
participants reported that the ambiguous Moral Status Type was most “fascinating”, and that the good Moral Status
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used the ‘RVAideMemoire’ package in R (Hervé & Hervé, 2020). All pairwise comparisons
were statistically different from one another (p’s < 0.001) besides morally good compared to
morally bad (p = 0.99)27.

Ambiguous

Figure 12. Total counts for the number of selected Moral Status Types across participants.
Morally good and morally bad were selected more often than both ambiguous and average with
morally average being the lowest.
Phase Two
For the phase two analyses, all models are specified following the same format. We
specify random intercepts and slopes for participants 28, self-reported identification is included as
a covariate (patterns of results remain unchanged when excluding), and decision made during
phase one is included as a fixed effect. All models use morally average as the comparison group.
Curiosity & Confidence

Type was “easiest”. In total, 40% of participants said ambiguous moral status was most fascinating (vs. 31% for bad,
23% for good, and 6% for average Moral Status Type). 58% of participants reported that good moral status was
easiest (vs. 21% for average, 16% for bad, and 4% for ambiguous Moral Status Type).
27
We also conducted a binomial test, comparing each observed probability to chance. That analysis is reported in
Appendix B, Table S3.
28
Patterns of results remain consistent if we exclude random slope for participant. We report model fit indices in the
supplemental material.
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First, we tested whether participants reported different levels of curiosity and confidence
for their selected target. Confidence and curiosity were moderately positively corrected, r = .22,
p < 0.001. Results suggested that participants reported more curiosity for ambiguous (b = 0.89,
SE = 0.08, t(282) = 11.31, p < .001, r = 0.56, 95% CI [0.73, 1.05]), bad (b = 1.24, SE = 0.09,
t(386) = 13.49, p < .001, r = 0.57, 95% CI [1.05, 1.42]), and good (b = 0.42, SE = 0.06, t(252) =
6.75, p < .001, r = 0.39, 95% CI [0.28, 0.52]) moral targets than for average ones. Overall,
participants reported more curiosity for the ambiguous and the bad Moral Status Types.
For confidence, participants reported significantly less confidence for ambiguous targets
(b = −0.58, SE = 0.07, t(336) = −7.88, p < .001, r = 0.40, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.45]) than average
targets. For the two morally clear categories—good and bad—participants reported more
confidence. Compared to average, bad targets (b = 0.60, SE = 0.10, t(403) = 6.09, p < .001, r =
0.29, 95% CI [0.41, 0.79]), and good ones (b = 0.52, SE = 0.06, t(362) = 8.01, p < .001, r = 0.38,
95% CI [0.39, 0.64]) induced the most feelings of confidence (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Patterns of results for the curiosity and confidence ratings. The thick black line in the
boxes represents the mean, and the edges represent mean standard error from bootstrap.
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Self-reported Interest
Phase one selection predicted similar patterns for self-reported interest as with curiosity
(r = 0.69, p < 0.001). Results suggested that participants reported more interest for ambiguous (b
= 1.10, SE = 0.09, t(290) = 12.41, p < .001, r = 0.59, 95% CI [0.92, 1.27]), bad (b = 1.51, SE =
0.11, t(372) = 13.96, p < .001, r = 0.59, 95% CI [1.30, 1.72]), and good (b = 0.69, SE = 0.07,
t(261) = 10.25, p < .001, r = 0.54, 95% CI [0.56, 0.82]) compared to average moral targets.
Expected Learning
We also asked participants to indicate whether they expected to learn something about
the selected target. Results yielded similar patterns to interest. Participants reported more
expected learning for ambiguous (b = .19, SE = 0.07, t(275) = 2.74, p = .006, r = 0.16, 95% CI
[0.05, 0.33]), bad (b = 0.57, SE = 0.09, t(417) = 6.38, p < .001, r = 0.30, 95% CI [0.39, 0.75]),
and good (b = 0.25, SE = 0.06, t(235) = 3.85, p < .001, r = 0.24, 95% CI [0.12, 0.38]) compared
to average moral targets.
Phase three
In the final phase of the trial, we used a similar specification as used in phase two, testing
whether phase one selection predicted phase three judgments, and whether phase two judgments
predicted phase three judgments. For moral curiosity, we also conducted an exploratory analysis
to test whether curiosity moderated the relationship between phase one moral target selection and
phase three judgments. All of the following models include participants as a random intercept.
Normality
To replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1b, we explored how normality
ratings were predicted by moral target selection and curiosity. Results suggested that ambiguous
moral targets, b = −1.58, SE = 0.09, t(284) = −17.32, p < .001, r = 0.72, 95% CI [-1.76, -1.40],
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morally bad targets, b = −2.44, SE = 0.10, t(458) = −23.58, p < .001, r = 0.74, 95% CI [-2.65, 2.24], and morally good targets, b = –1.94, SE = 0.09, t(276) = −22.31, p < .001, r = 0.80, 95%
CI [-2.11, -1.77], were all rated as less average than average moral targets. Interestingly, only
ambiguous (M = 3.59, SD = 1.42) and average (M = 5.24, SD =1.29) moral targets had mean
ratings above the mid-point on the scale. Similarly, for ideal judgments, participants rated
morally ambiguous, b = −0.60, SE = 0.08, t(252) = −7.99, p < .001, r = 0.44, 95% CI [-0.75,0.45], and morally bad targets, b = −2.26, SE = 0.08, t(455) = −27.68, p < .001, r = 0.79, 95% CI
[-2.42, -2.10], targets as less ideal than morally average. But that morally good targets were more
ideal than morally average, b = 1.71, SE = 0.08, t(282) = 21.74, p < .001, r = 0.79, 95% CI [1.55,
1.86] (see Figure 14). Average (M = 4.01, SD = 1.19) and good (M = 5.64, SD =1.20) moral
targets were rated above mid-point on the scale.

Figure 14. Patterns of results for the average and ideal ratings in Experiment 2. The thick black
line in the boxes represents the mean, and the edges represent mean standard error from
bootstrap.
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Satisfaction
We first tested whether satisfaction at phase three differed as a function of phase one
moral target selection. Results suggested that satisfaction of the explanation reveal during the
third phase of the trial was higher for the ambiguous, b = 0.33, SE = 0.09, t(292) = 3.78, p <
.001, r = 0.22, 95% CI [0.16, 0.51], and the good targets, b = 0.92, SE = 0.09, t(272) = 9.77, p <
.001, r = 0.51, 95% CI [0.74, 1.11], compared to the average targets. Satisfaction was lower for
the bad moral targets than the average targets, b = −0.31, SE = 0.11, t(464) = −2.82, p = .005, r =
0.51, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.10].
Next, we tested whether curiosity rated at phase two predicted satisfaction at phase three
(with multiplicative interaction term and fixed effects included in the model). Results supported
this prediction. The more curiosity participants reported at phase two, the more satisfaction they
reported at phase three, b = 0.27, SE = 0.04, t(465) = 6.27, p < .001, r = 0.28, 95% CI [0.18,
0.36].
Perceived Learning
To test the effect of moral curiosity on perceptions of learning, we first investigated
whether the perceived learning questions captured similar constructs 29. The correlations among
the measures were moderate, r’s < .48 and the internal reliability low (Cronbach’s alpha = .62).
As such, we analyzed each of the learning items separately. For each of the perceived learning
items, we were interested in whether curiosity predicted perceived learning for the different
phase one decisions. As such, we used a slightly different specification for each of the three
items. We entered phase two curiosity ratings, phase one moral target selection, and their
interaction term as fixed effects, including random intercept and slopes for participant.

29

These are independent, pre-registered tests and as such do not have corrections to the p-values.
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For perceived utility of learning, the marginal main effect of curiosity was statistically
significant, b = 0.18, SE = 0.04, t(565) = 4.51, p < .001, r = 0.19. There was no significant
interaction or marginal main effect of phase one target selection. The more individuals reported
being curious, the more they reported learning something useful. When we included only phase
one moral target selection (excluding curiosity and the interaction term), results revealed
statistically significant differences in learning utility as a function of selected target. Ambiguous
moral targets, b = 0.27, SE = 0.08, t(287) = 3.31, p = .001, r = 0.19, 95% CI [0.11, 0.43], and
good moral targets, b = 0.41, SE = 0.08, t(259) = 5.25, p < .001, r = 0.31, 95% CI [0.26, 0.56],
but not bad ones, b = 0.16, SE = 0.9, p = .09, elicited more perceived learning than average moral
targets.
For the real-life pattern question, results suggested that ambiguous, b = −0.90, SE = 0.28,
t(674) = −3.18, p = .002, r = 0.12, 95% CI [-1.36, -0.33], good, b = −0.96, SE = 0.28, t(957) =
−3.42, p < .001, r = 0.11, 95% CI [-1.59, -0.43], and bad, b = −1.01, SE = 0.29, t(1026) = −3.44,
p < .001, r = 0.11, 95% CI [-1.53, -0.40], moral targets were each less likely to reveal a pattern at
phase three than average moral targets. There was no marginal main effect of curiosity alone (b =
0.05, p = 0.21). The interaction between moral curiosity and morally good target selection
predict perceived utility, b = 0.12, SE = 0.06, t(1043) = 2.10, p = .036, r = 0.06, 95% CI [0.05,
0.23], relative to average moral targets. There were no other significant interactions.
Lastly, we investigated whether curiosity predicted learning about something broad (vs.
something narrow and only related to the present experiment). Perceptions that phase three
revealed broadly applicable knowledge showed similar patterns of effects as the pattern-related
learning question. Again, ambiguous, b = −1.80, SE = 0.32, t(684) = −5.65, p < .001, r = 0.21,
95% CI [-2.42, -1.17], good, b = −1.89, SE = 0.30, t(806) = −6.23, p < .001, r = 0.21, 95% CI [-

78
2.49, -1.29], and bad, b = −2.60, SE = 0.33, t(970) = −7.98, p < .001, r = 0.25, 95% CI [3.24, 1.95], moral targets were rated as lower in their broad applicability compared to average moral
targets. There was also no marginal main effect of curiosity alone (b = -0.07, p = 0.16).
However, significant interactions again emerged. For morally ambiguous targets, increases in
curiosity predicted broader applicability, b = 0.13, SE = 0.06, t(741) = 2.04, p = .042, r = 0.07,
95% CI [0.004, 0.25]. The same was true for morally good targets, b = 0.15, SE = 0.06, t(861) =
2.47, p = .014, r = 0.09, 95% CI [0.03, 0.28], and morally bad targets, b = 0.18, SE = 0.06,
t(1022) = 2.78, p = .005, r = 0.09, 95% CI [0.05, 0.30]. Overall, relative to morally average
(which showed a negative slope; b = .07; p = .16), as curiosity increased so too did perceived
broadness of learning (see Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Interaction between curiosity (scaled) and phase one moral target selection.
Confidence intervals represent +/-1 SE. Model is fit with participants included as random
intercepts.
Individual Differences
Given that the dispositional measures had different scales, we first z-scored the individual
difference traits prior to analysis. Next, we examined the correlational structure of the individual
difference measures and report them in Table 3.
Table 3. Correlation matrix for moral opposition, harmfulness & policy support.
Measure
1. Morbid Curiosity
2. Need for Cognition
3. Belief in a Just World
4. Imaginative Resistance
5. Perspective-taking Empathy

1
-.02
.03
-.30***
.18*

2

3

4

5

-.19**
-.02
.32***

-.11
.08

-.07

--

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Holm method for p-value adjustment. N = 304
We then tested whether the individual differences moderated the relationship between
phase one moral target selection and curiosity. Results supported the moral worldbuilding
framework. For each of the dispositions measured, people on the high end of the scales reported
more curiosity for the moral targets. There were significant interactions for each of the models as
well. Here, we report the results for the imaginative resistance model because it was the only one
where the interaction was not simply a magnitude effect (e.g., people high morbid curiosity were
more curious about bad moral targets). The other individual differences are reported in
supplemental analyses for this experiment in Appendix C.
When including phase one moral target selection as a fixed effect, random slopes and
intercepts for participants, and the interaction term, the marginal effect of imaginative resistance
trended toward statistically significance, b = 0.16, SE = 0.08, t(271) = 2.05, p = .042, r = 0.12,
95% CI [0.006, 0.32] (see Figure 16). However, there was a significant interaction between
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morally ambiguous targets and imaginative resistance relative to morally average targets, b =
−0.20, SE = 0.08, t(276) = −2.58, p = .010, r = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.35, -0.05]. Further, simple
slopes analysis suggested that for the average and the good Moral Status Types, participants high
in imaginative resistance were particularly curious (average: b = 0.16, SE = 0.08, t = 2.05, p =
0.04; good: b = 0.20, SE = 0.07, t = 3.02, p < 0.001), but not for morally ambiguous or morally
bad individuals (p’s > 0.50).

Figure 16. Interaction between imaginative resistance (scaled) and phase one moral target
selection. Confidence intervals represent +/-1 SE. Model is fit with participants included as
random intercepts.
We also conducted an exploratory analysis examining whether individual differences
predicted perceived utility of the learned information. There were significant interactions
between phase one moral target selection and the dispositional measures predicting utility of
learning for all but belief in a just world. Here, we report only one of the individual difference
measures—perspective taking—in the main text and refer readers to the supplemental analyses
for the additional measures. Perspective-taking alone was not a significant predictor of learning
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utility. However, morally good, b = 0.20, SE = 0.08, t(256) = 2.63, p = .009, r = 0.16, 95% CI
[0.05, 0.35], and morally bad, b = 0.16, SE = 0.08, t(270) = 2.03, p = .043, r = 0.12, 95% CI
[0.005, 0.32], did moderate the relationship between perspective-taking and perceived utility of
learning. Relative to the morally average targets more perspective taking for morally good and
morally bad selections predicted greater perceived learning.
Actual Learning
Finally, we examined whether moral curiosity influenced actual learning of the
encountered targets. To do this, we created an average score for the memory task (M = .75, SD =
.14) and tested whether curiosity ratings predicted memory task performance. Given the nature
of the task, we included only participants with an overall accuracy above 50%. Results did not
support our predictions. Moral curiosity did not predict later memory performance, p = 0.49. The
same pattern emerged for self-reported interest30. There was no significant relationship between
interest and memory performance, p = 0.31. In contrast, perceived utility of learning did emerge
as a small but statistically significant predictor of memory performance, b = 0.01, SE = 0.005,
t(289) = 2.81, p = .005, r = 0.16, 95% CI [0.004, 0.03]31.
Discussion
Overall, Experiment 2 provided mixed support for hypotheses, but yielded insight into
the function and the consequences of moral curiosity for moral worldbuilding. In phase one, we
found that morally good and morally bad—the more extreme moral categories—were selected
more than the uncertain groups. Morally ambiguous were also selected significantly more often

30

Patterns of results remain unchanged when including all participants (i.e., those whose accuracy was above 50%).
Additionally, patterns remained the same when investigating these ratings for the different phase one selected moral
targets. However, both curiosity and interest became small but significant predictors of memory performance when
controlling for type of phase one selection made p’s < 0.013.
31
Satisfaction was a marginally significant predictor of memory, b = 0.01, SE = 0.007, t(289) = 1.87, p = .062, r =
0.11 when excluding participants whose accuracy fell below the 50% line (chance).
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than morally average people. Rather than engaging with moral targets that don’t necessarily fit
into one’s moral world, people were also drawn to targets that confirm moral categorizations.
This pattern fits the “superhero movies as pornography” view (Pizarro & Baumeister, 2013) and
research that suggests we are motivated to avoid engaging with others’ minds deeply (Lin et al,.
2010). People seem eager to encounter moral information that is easy to digest, rather than go
through the effort of categorizing for oneself.
Phase two also yielded insight into moral curiosity, moral interest, and its consequences.
First, we found that ratings of curiosity and interest were highest for the morally ambiguous and
the morally bad moral targets. This pattern matches the results of the pilot and Experiment 1a.
The bad and moderately bad (morally ambiguous) targets piqued curiosity more than the more
average moral targets. We also saw that effort and interest were again at odds (see also Ferguson
et al., 2020). Participants reported that the ambiguous group was the most fascinating but also the
most challenging. Entertainment has solved this tension by crafting narratives about these
fascinating characters in minimally effortful settings. Movies and cinema allow us to make the
jump from believing in to imagining (or simulating) content and characters we know to be madeup in visual-audio settings that are rich with affective value (Carroll, 2008). Here, fascination
with ambiguous moral targets was not high enough to offset the effort of reading and cognitively
processing ambiguous moral targets.
Phase three replicated and clarified many of the results of Experiment 1a and 1b. First,
we saw again that participants rated the morally good and morally bad targets as least average,
but that good and morally average were seen as most ideal. Phase three results also suggested
that moral curiosity influences satisfaction and perceived learning—the more morally curious
participants reported being, the more satisfied and the more learning utility they perceived.
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Contrary to predictions, moral curiosity did not predict more actual learning. This pattern mirrors
that of previous research, which suggests that curiosity tracks perceived rather than actual
learning (Liquin & Lombrozo, 2022) 32.
Finally, we also found the evidence that dispositions play a large role in shaping
individuals’ moral worldviews. The moral worldbuilding framework posits that individual
learning, culture, beliefs and more should influence and constrain moral curiosity. For instance,
we found that imaginative resistance interacts with phase one moral target to influence curiosity.
This finding and the other similar disposition findings reported in the supplemental analyses for
this experiment suggest that it isn’t just traits or external information that shapes moral curiosity
drives. Instead, it is an intersection of trait and state external information that drives explanationseeking and curiosity. Moreover, the imaginative resistance finding also provide further evidence
that individual difference affects which kinds of moral content individuals are curious about—
morbidly curious people are more drawn to the morally bad targets and those high in imaginative
resistance find the morally good targets more interesting than those low in imaginative
resistance. That is, those that do not enjoy imagining things that are morally deviant report more
curiosity for the average and good guys.
While this experiment provides strong evidence of the moral worldbuilding framework,
illuminating that morally average targets do not induce moral curiosity, but rather those that
differ from average, it is still unclear whether this drive is specific to the moral domain. Besides
those who were morally exceptional (either morally good or bad), morally ambiguous were
selected often, and elicited high levels of moral curiosity. In Experiment 3, we will examine

32

We also tested whether curiosity or expected learning mediated the path from perceived learning to actual learning
but found no evidence of mediation.
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whether it is ambiguity in the moral domain specifically, rather than ambiguity more generally,
that drives curiosity to engage with the minds of others.
CHAPTER IV
Is moral ambiguity special?
Experiment 3
A great deal of research suggests that humans are cognitive misers (Böckenholt, 2012;
Cameron et al., 2019; Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Frederick, 2005;
Inzlicht et al., 2018; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kool et al., 2010). We avoid cognitive effort
when possible, and we are careful about the kinds of things we choose to expend cognitive effort
to engage with—factoring in rewards (Ferguson et al., 2020) and likelihood of errors (Dunn et
al., 2019). The amount of cognitive effort expended to process a stimulus also effects our
evaluative judgments of that stimulus. For example, when works of art are easy to (visually)
process, people tend to rate them more positively (Reber et al., 2004). In the context of risk
evaluations, when words are difficult to pronounce, people tend to rate them as more risky and
more harmful (Song & Shwartz, 2009). That it, there is a direct link between ease and affective
evaluation. People largely prefer to engage with familiar, predictable, and easy to understand
content.
Engaging with others’ minds is also a demanding task that often requires incentives to
initiate (Contreras-Huerta et al., 2020). Indeed, people are more inclined to interpret the actions
of another person rather than attempt to understand their mind (Lin et al., 2020). The avoidance
of effortful engagement in the social domain is especially consequential for empathy, which is
critical to sharing and understanding the experiences of others (Decety & Cowell, 2014). When
possible, people avoid feeling empathy for other humans, but do not do so for other living things
like animals (Cameron et al., 2021). Altogether, research suggests that there is something
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uniquely taxing about engaging with the minds of other people. Yet, evidence from pilot,
Experiment 1a, and Experiment 2, along with people’s attraction to ambiguity in fictional worlds
suggests that moral ambiguity may be uniquely motivating to engage with. We are curious about
these otherwise disfluent, contradictory people that require engagement with the person’s mind.
One reason we may be willing to engage with ambiguity in the moral domain is that it prompts
Moral Worldbuilding motives, motivating curiosity and exploration to understand and learn
about our moral world. In that case, moral ambiguity is special—it prompts engagement with
content that would otherwise be avoided (if not in the moral domain). Another reason we may be
motivated to engage with moral ambiguity is that it is rewarding to notice and understand
contradictory signals of value more generally. As such, we conducted Experiment 3 to test
whether the attraction to ambiguity is specific to the moral domain.
Experiment 3 expands the understanding of moral curiosity by comparing moral to
aesthetic ambiguity, testing the uniqueness of moral ambiguity. Specifically, this experiment will
test whether interest is higher for ambiguity in the moral character or the aesthetic judgments of
an artist’s work. Aesthetic judgments, like moral judgments, gain value from social consensus,
and retain their value regardless of their physical location. Someone’s moral traits stay with them
as they move through life and different roles. Similarly, a piece of artwork retains its value
whether presented at the Metropolitan Museum of Art or at the Louvre (and potentially over time
as well). Other common social perception categories like competence do not share this feature
with morality. Competence of a person is only relevant for a narrow range of contexts.
Additionally, the aesthetic comparison also allows us to better understand whether it is a
negativity bias that dominates curiosity. If participants are uniquely interested in moral
ambiguity, this would suggest it is access to unknown, nonnormative minds that is likely the
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driver of moral curiosity rather than just badness per se. We hypothesized people would prefer to
learn about the minds of morally ambiguous rather than aesthetically ambiguous individuals.
Method
Design
The design mirrored Experiment 2, but phase one only included moral ambiguity and
aesthetic ambiguity as decision options. We used a within-in subjects design to examine the
effect of ambiguity status (morally ambiguous and aesthetically ambiguous) on moral curiosity.
Phase two again asked participants about their judgments of their selection from phase one.
Phase three revealed vignettes of motive information for the selected target. There was no
memory task.
Participants
We again preregistered our recruitment goal and exclusion criteria. We recruited 421
participants from Prolific with the goal of preserving a sample size of about 348. We conducted a
power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to detect an effect with an odds ratio of 1.4.
After excluding people who failed attention (N = 29) and instructions comprehension checks (N
= 1), we conducted analyses on a final sample of 391 participants (Mage = 39.84, SDage = 14.36,
Male = 190, Female = 194, Other = 6, 1 did not report). The inclusion criterion for Prolific data
collection was current United State residence, no participation in pilot studies related to this
experiment, 99% approval rating on Prolific, use of a desktop or laptop computer for the
experiment, and a minimum of 5 submissions of Prolific. Prolific participants were paid $2.40 on
average for their participation.
Materials
Phase 1
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Ambiguity Type Stimuli. We used a subset of the same names from Experiment 2 and
paired them with 20 total ambiguity sliders: 10 morally ambiguous and 10 aesthetically
ambiguous sliders. The ratings on the sliders (i.e., how ambiguous they were) for the two
ambiguity types were matched. An example of the slider stimuli is presented in Table 4.
Decision Task. Here, we used the same decision task as in Experiment 2 but included
only two options: morally ambiguous or aesthetically ambiguous.
Phase 2
Curiosity. During phase two, participants indicated their curiosity for more information
about the selected target. We asked participants, “How curious are you to know more about this
person?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all curious to 9 = Extremely curious.
Interest. Participants also indicated their confidence in their prediction about how the
selected person will be. We asked participants “How interesting do you think this person will
be?” rated on a scale from 1 = Not at all to 9 = Extremely.
Phase 3
Revealed moral information. In the final phase of the trial, participants are revealed
moral motive information about the target and no image of their face, regardless of the selection
made. We again used LIWC to match the revealed information on length. The information
revealed was either morally ambiguous (depicting someone who is both morally good and
morally bad), or aesthetically ambiguous (depicting someone whose work is both good and bad).
Normality. The same measures of normality were used as in Experiment 2 (7-point
scales).
Satisfaction. We used the same measure of satisfaction as in Experiment 2.
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Perceived Learning. The same three items measured perceived learning. A utility of
learning item, a pattern item, and a broadness of applicability item.
Table 4. Three phases of Experiment 2 and items rated at each stage.
Phase 1: Initial Decision

Phase 2: Predicted
Judgments

1. How curious are you to
know more about this
person?
2. How interesting do you
think this person will be?

Phase 3: Actual Judgments

1.How average is this person?
2.How ideal is this person?
3.How satisfying do you find the
information you learned about
this person?
4.To what extent is the
information you learned useful
to you in the future?
5.Do you think the information
you learned helps reveal a
genuine pattern, structure, or
regularity about humanity?
6.Do you think the information
you learned is narrow (only
applies to the person you
learned about) or broad (also
applies to people in general)?

Individual Difference Measures
Morbid Curiosity. We included the same items to measure MSC. We collapsed these
into a single variable (α = .94). The full list of the selected items is available in Appendix A.
Imaginative Resistance. We used the same three items to measure imaginative
resistance and collapsed them into a single index (α = .81). The full list of the selected items is
available in Appendix A.
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Perspective Taking. We also included the same three items to measure perspective
taking. We again collapsed it into a single index (α = .87). The full list of the selected items is
available in Appendix A.
Procedure
Consenting participants completed 10 trials each with three phases. The flow of the
phases matched that of Experiment 2. After participants made a selection, they began answered a
question about curiosity and interest, and then began phase three. Participants were shown a
short vignette and asked to make a series of judgments (presented in random order). Participants
then completed the individual difference measures, completed demographics questions, and were
debriefed and paid for their time.
Results
The analysis strategy was similar to Experiment 2. However, we preregistered conducting
a mixed-effects logistic regression as the primary model in error. Given the nature of the task,
like in Experiment 2, we conducted a Chi-square test to examine whether participants selected
one option more frequently than the other. Mirroring Experiment 2, we use mixed-effects models
for all other analyses and specify random intercepts and slopes for participants33. All models use
aesthetic ambiguity as the reference group.
Phase 1
To examine whether participants showed a preference for one type of ambiguity over the
other, we conducted a Pearson Chi-square test. Results suggested that compared to what would
be expected if participants were choosing at random between the two targets, there was a

33

Model fit was significantly improved by the addition of random slopes for participants for all models. We report
these model fit indices in the supplemental material. Additionally, conclusions remain the same with an interceptsonly model for all modes besides the interaction between curiosity and phase one decision predicting satisfaction.

90
preference for morally ambiguous targets χ2(1, N = 3,910) = 72.39, p < 0.001 (see Figure 17).
Morally ambiguous targets pique curiosity more than aesthetically ambiguous targets.

Figure 17. Total counts for the number of selected Ambiguous targets across participants.
Targets were either morally ambiguous (labeled moral) or aesthetically ambiguous (labeled art).
Phase 2
Curiosity and interest. Contrary to our predictions, there was no significant difference
between phase one ambiguity decision on ratings of curiosity, b = 0.03, SE = 0.05, t(354) = 0.69,
p = .489, r = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.12]. This was also true for interest; no statistically
significant difference between phase one decisions emerged for interest, b = 0.02, SE = 0.05,
t(358) = 0.43, r = 0.02, p = .668, 95% CI [-0.08, 0.11].
Phase 3
Normality. Next, we tested whether phase one decision predicted how ideal and average
people rated the revealed information. We found that morally ambiguous targets were rated as
less ideal, b = −0.45, SE = 0.05, t(384) = −9.41, p < .001, r = 0.43, 95% CI [-0.55, -0.36], and
less average, b = −0.56, SE = 0.06, t(384) = −9.77, p < .001, r = 0.45, 95% CI [-0.67, -0.44] than
aesthetically ambiguous targets (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Patterns of results for the average and ideal ratings in Experiment 3. The thick black
line in the boxes represents the mean, and the edges represent mean standard error from
bootstrap.
Satisfaction. We then tested whether feelings of satisfaction differed based on phase one
decision. Results showed that morally ambiguous targets were more satisfying to learn about
than aesthetically ambiguous ones, b = 0.31, SE = 0.06, t(372) = 5.21, p < .001, r = 0.26, 95% CI
[0.19, 0.43].
We also explored whether curiosity and phase one decision together predicted
satisfaction. We entered curiosity, decision type, and their interaction term to predict satisfaction.
The results yielded a small but statistically significant interaction, b = −0.06, SE = 0.03, t(1289)
= −2.37, p = .018, r = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.12, -0.01], such that the more curiosity participants
reported, the more satisfaction they felt—a pattern which was particularly pronounced for the
aesthetic domain (p < 0.001; see Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Interaction between curiosity (scaled) and phase one ambiguity target selection.
Confidence intervals represent +/-1 SE. Model is fit with random intercepts and slopes for
participants.
Perceived Learning. As in Experiment 2, we tested whether phase one decision
predicted perceived learning. We again investigated whether the learning items could be
combined into a single index. The correlation between the utility and broadness of applicability
item were only slightly positively correlated (r = .18, p < 0.001) and the reliability did not meet
the preregistered cutoff (Cronbach’s alpha = .65). As such, we investigated the three items
separately. Participants reported greater utility of learning for the moral compared to the
aesthetic phase one target, b = 0.64, SE = 0.05, t(358) = 12.42, p < .001, r = 0.55, 95% CI [0.54,
0.74]. Similarly, moral ambiguity predicted significantly higher judgments that the information
revealed a genuine pattern, b = 0.70, SE = 0.06, t(378) = 11.26, p < .001, r = 0.50, 95% CI [0.58,
0.82], and that it applies broadly rather than narrowly, b = 0.29, SE = 0.07, t(388) = 4.15, p <
.001, r = 0.21, 95% CI [0.15, 0.43].
We also tested whether phase one decision and curiosity interacted to predict learning.
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While curiosity was a significant predictor of perceived learning for the utility of learning
judgment, b = 0.16, SE = 0.02, t(2334) = 8.33, p < .001, r = 0.17, and the pattern of learning
judgment, b = 0.06, SE = 0.02, t(1883) = 2.96, p = .003, r = 0.07, but not for the broadness of
applicability item (b = -0.03, SE = .02, p = .257). However, no significant interaction emerged
for any of the three perceived learning items (p’s > 0.257).
Individual Difference Measures
Lastly, we examined whether individual difference measures moderate the relationship
between phase one decision selection and phase two curiosity. We again specify both random
intercepts and slopes and report imaginative resistance and perspective-taking in the main text.
The pattern for morbid curiosity is reported in supplemental analyses in Appendix C.
Table 5. Correlations among individual difference traits for Experiment 3.
Measure
1. Morbid Curiosity
2. Imaginative Resistance
3. Perspective-taking Empathy

1
--.40***
.11***

2

3

-.0008

--

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Holm method for p-value adjustment. N = 304
For imaginative resistance, we found with the two predictors and the interaction term
entered, phase one decision was no longer a significant predictor of curiosity, b = 0.03, SE =
0.05, p = .521. However, imaginative resistance did significantly predict curiosity, b = 0.33, SE =
0.08, t(394) = 4.06, p < .001, r = 0.20, 95% CI [0.17, 0.48]. There was also a significant
interaction, b = −0.14, SE = 0.05, t(369) = −3.02, p = .003, r = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.23, -0.05].
Participants reported high in imaginative resistance reported more curiosity for the aesthetic
domain than they did for the moral domain (see Figure 20).
Perspective-taking empathy showed a similar pattern of results. When including
perspective-taking, phase one decision, and their interaction term, phase one decision was no
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longer a significant predictor of curiosity, b = 0.03, SE = 0.05, p = .506. Perspective-taking was a
significant predictor of curiosity, b = 0.32, SE = 0.08, t(390) = 3.98, p < .001, r = 0.20, 95% CI
[0.16, 0.48]. Additionally, there was a significant interaction between the two, b = 0.10, SE =
0.05, t(347) = 2.18, p = .030, r = 0.12, 95% CI [0.01, 0.19] such that the more perspective-taking
participants reported, the higher their reported curiosity for the morally ambiguous targets (see
Figure 20).

Figure 20. Interaction between individual difference measures and phase one ambiguity
selection. The patterns flip for imaginative resistance and perspective-taking. Confidence
intervals represent +/-1 SE. Model is fit with random intercepts and slopes for participants.
Discussion
Overall, we found support for our predictions. Participants were more likely to select the
morally ambiguous targets compared to the aesthetically ambiguous, and they reported greater
satisfaction and perceived learning for moral relative to aesthetic targets. However, we did not
find the predicted difference in self-reported curiosity (or interest), which deviates from the
pattern of results in Experiment 2. Relative to another ambiguous and potentially unpredictable
category, participants view them as equally intriguing. We take this to be evidence of the
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uniqueness of moral ambiguity. While self-reported interest in unpredictable categories was
similar, selection preferences and differences in satisfaction and learning suggest that moral
ambiguity draws in interest and provides an avenue for learning that differs from other sources of
ambiguity.
We also investigated whether there were differences in the ideal and average judgments
between the two targets. Morally ambiguous targets were rated as less ideal and less average than
aesthetically ambiguous targets. Even though both target categories had the same amount of
ambiguity, when people deviate in the moral domain, there are consequences that don’t translate
to other domains. Based on the ideal judgments being below the mid-point (though the average
judgments are not), participants seem to see the morally ambiguous targets as being somewhat
morally bad. They nonetheless still pique interest, become preferred, and provide affective and
learning benefits.
Further, when looking to the individual difference measures, we again see evidence in
favor of a moral worldbuilding framework. Participants who are inclined to perspective-take and
become mentally engaged with others reported more curiosity for the morally ambiguous targets
than the aesthetically ambiguous ones. In contrast, those who are resistant to engaging with
negative or non-normative content reported more curiosity for the aesthetically ambiguous
targets than the moral ones. These contrasting patterns underscore how relevant individual
differences guide information-seeking. People who do not want to engage with the minds of
those who break moral rules also do not show approach tendencies toward that information—
attraction to moral ambiguity (or moral badness) is specific to those who find it interesting and
engaging.

96
CHAPTER V
Closing remarks
What do Tony Soprano, Dexter Morgan, and Harley Quinn have in common? These
fictional characters commit acts of violence, yet we root for their success anyway. This research
started with an under-theorized aspect of moral life: moral ambiguity and moral badness are
fascinating. Antiheroes––ambiguous moral figures in popular culture––and villains capture our
attention. Here, we offered Moral Worldbuilding as an explanation for why we are drawn to
moral badness, even when moral psychology theory strongly suggests that we should prefer
moral goodness. The Moral Worldbuilding framework proposes that the individual and their
environment interact to create a world—one that we are motivated to understand and maintain.
Worldbuilding motives, like moral curiosity, support the preservation of our moral worlds, help
us resolve inconsistencies, and consequently, help us to maintain our psychological wellbeing.
The Moral Worldbuilding framework predicts that we should be motivated to resolve
inconsistencies like those embodied by morally ambiguous characters in entertainment and in
real life, and we should be drawn to morally deviant others because they provide opportunities to
learn about the contours of our moral worlds.
A critical piece of the present argument is that there currently exists no parsimonious way
to integrate much of the surprising findings in morality. As noted in the introduction to this
dissertation, theorists have pointed to harm (e.g., Gray et al., 2014; Schein & Gray, 2018; but see
Scott et al., 2016), to many intuitions (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Graham et al., 2011; Rai & Fiske, 2011;
but see May, 2018), and to communication (e.g., Cushman et al., 2019; but see Jordan & Rand
2020), alongside many other concepts, as unifying lenses from which to understand morality.
These approaches, which often either mirror (implicitly or explicitly) or foreground larger ethical
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doctrines like utilitarianism and deontology, explain a great deal of idiosyncratic findings within
morality. And yet, the extant moral literature is not easily able to be integrated into any of them,
rendering many findings that suggest a dissociation between actions and expressions or a
preference toward harm (e.g., Morris et al., 2022) surprising.
Moral Worldbuilding borrows from social psychological and neuroscientific research and
philosophical work on epistemic emotions to fill the gap in the moral literature. It demonstrates
that moral ambiguity and moral badness can be interesting and engaging, which conflicts with
models, both moral and not, that suggest we are driven to seek out goodness and pleasure, and to
avoid badness and pain (see also van Lieshout et al., 2018). By using an epistemic lens to peer
through and comprehend moral cognition, we can see why the psychological phenomena that
underlie standard surprising moral findings like moral licensing and do-gooder derogation
emerge. A primary motive in everyday life is to understand the moral minds of others and our
place in that moral world. For example, do-gooders may threaten what we think of as our place
in the world (i.e., through social comparison), and how we understand and react to the motives
and desires of others (i.e., their typicality; Forgas, 1992). When people make us believe they
have good intentions, but then violate them (i.e., a hypocrite), that surprise triggers realization of
an inconsistency in our worldviews that must be resolved. Analogous to classic social
psychological dissonance reduction (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), when encountering the
hypocrite, one could adjust their judgment of the action (the value violating one), or one could
adjust their judgment of the person (what people tend to do).
Similarly, canonical moral findings—that we condemn immoral actions (e.g., Jordan et al.,
2016), and readily assign blame to bad others (e.g., Siegel et al., 2017), even when no harm
actually occurred (Inbar et al., 2012)—also fit well within the Moral Worldbuilding framework.
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We are motivated to uphold the boundaries of good and bad because they make up the
foundation of our moral worlds. These boundaries also influence how we see the rest of our
worlds—the possibilities within it (Phillips & Cushman, 2017), the norms that matter (Bear &
Knobe, 2017), and more. Indeed, when we look to the kinds of stories that make up popular
fictional worlds, they tend to have moral rules that closely mirror our own. This contrasts with
physical laws (e.g., flying on a broomstick), which are violated frequently in fictional worlds.
This is because imagining worlds where the moral rules are vastly different is uniquely difficult
(Gendler, 2000; Black & Barnes, 2020). Morality has a stickiness that makes it a distinct
influence on how we understand and interact with our worlds, both fictional and real ones.
Taken together, this research provides the first evidence for the theoretical framework of
Moral Worldbuilding—focusing on moral curiosity. While there are many epistemic emotions
for which morality may be tuned, curiosity is a powerful drive that contribute to a number of
important information and explanation seeking behaviors. For instance, while surprise is
typically regarded as the first reaction to schema-inconsistent information (Noordewier et al.,
2016), curiosity often follows and promotes exploratory behaviors and personal growth
(Kashdan et al., 2004). Curiosity is critical to knowledge acquisition, rationality, and other
largely epistemic functions (da Sousa, 2008; Elgen, 2008; Pekrun & Stephens, 2012). The moral
worldbuilding framework suggests that moral curiosity should guide knowledge seeking in ways
that mirror domain general curiosity, but the functions differ in important ways. Moral curiosity
serves to prompt us to explore and understand the morality of others, of ourselves (i.e., selfknowledge), and in our society.
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5.1 Summary of basic findings
Across five experiments, we found that when ambiguity refers to character—how
polarizing someone is—people find them more interesting than those who are morally good, but
not those who are morally bad. In contrast, when ambiguity referred instead to the kinds of
actions people commit (i.e., a mixture of good and bad things), people rate them as resembling
the average person, and are not motivated to seek explanations for their behavior or further
understand their minds. When someone’s actions clustered around only good or only bad, we
found that people were more curious to learn about them. This suggests that how much someone
deviates from what is morally normative may hold the key for understanding both the motive to
explore the minds of others, and the function. People whose morality differs from our own
provides a learning opportunity—to learn about the inner workings of a mind different from our
own or the ones we are familiar with. Further, we also found that self-reported moral curiosity
was highest for ambiguous and immoral moral targets compared to morally good and morally
average ones, and that moral ambiguity is distinctly interesting. The results of these experiments
provide a path for understanding what moral ambiguity is, and evidence that both moral
ambiguity and immorality serve as unique triggers of curiosity for explanation-seeking.
5.1.1 Summary of Chapter II: Pilot Experiment, Experiments 1a and 1b
In Chapter II, we explored whether the impact of moral character type on curiosity for
explanation-seeking. A pilot experiment provided initial evidence of an attraction to explanations
for immoral minds. We compared popular television and movie character who we categorized as
either heroes (morally good), villains (morally bad), or antiheroes (possessing both morally good
and bad traits). Results suggested that participants were most curious to learn about the minds of
morally ambiguous and morally bad (villain) characters compared to morally good characters
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(heroes). This pattern was flipped for self-reported interest. Participants reported being more
interested in the morally good compared to the morally ambiguous or bad characters, supporting
the notion that moral expression and behavior often diverge. Overall, the pilot experiment
established in the lab what we see when looking at the kinds of fictional stories (and nonfictional ones like true crime too) that attract us—people are curious about moral rule breakers.
Experiments 1a and 1b replicated and extended the findings from the pilot experiment to
novel people. While results across the two studies were not completely consistent, we did find
that people are reliably curious about the minds and actions of morally bad people. In
Experiment 1a, we also found that people were curious about ambiguous moral people—those
who others categorized as partly good and partly bad. In Experiment 1b, we adjusted the
manipulation to instead reference the categorization of people’s actions. This change
consequently made moral ambiguity less interesting than perfectly morally good people.
Participants also rated how average and ideal each moral character type was. We found that the
extremity of, or how different from normal the moral character, the more they elicited curiosity
for explanation-seeking.
Overall, these findings shed light on what we are curious to learn about in the moral
domain. Moral minds that differ from the norm elicit the most curiosity for explanations. These
findings also help to clarify what it means for someone to be morally ambiguous. When there
was implied conflict in the character of a target, participants were eager to learn more about their
minds. When presented with direct information about a target’s actions, participants rated them
as most morally average and were less curious to gain access to their moral minds.
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5.1.3 Summary of Chapter III: Experiment 2
In Chapter III, we examined whether moral curiosity predicted perceived and actual
learning. Moral Worldbuilding theory suggests that moral curiosity should be in the service of
learning about and exploring our moral worlds. In Experiment 2, we held the kind of information
available constant, and examined whether curiosity for selected targets predicted learning, and
how that varied by moral target type. We found that curiosity predicted perceived but not actual
learning, and that self-reported curiosity was highest again for the morally ambiguous and
morally bad categorizations. We also found that confidence and curiosity were inversely related
for the morally ambiguous category only, suggesting that there is indeed something uniquely
motivating and engaging about moral ambiguity.
We also examined whether individual difference traits moderated the relationship
between preference and curiosity. We found that Imaginative Resistance, Morbid Curiosity,
Need for Cognition, and Perspective-taking empathy all moderated this effect in slightly
different directions. Overall, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the Moral
Worldbuilding framework. Individual differences in how people want the world to look
influence the kind of information they are curious about. Individual moral curiosity affects
perception of learning and feelings of satisfaction, which then serve to reinforce the loop
(Muryama, 2022).
5.1.4 Summary Chapter 4: Experiment 3
In Chapter IV, we examined whether curiosity for ambiguity is specific to the moral
domain. In general, we found support for our hypotheses. Moral ambiguity was selected more
often and lead to greater feelings of satisfaction and learning (but not self-reported curiosity). We
also found individual differences again moderated interest in moral ambiguity. While people
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high in imaginative resistance were more avoidant of moral ambiguity, those high in perspectivetaking empathy were more curious to learn about them.
5.2 Caveats and limitations
While the present experiments provide initial evidence of Moral Worldbuilding and some
of the functions and consequences of moral curiosity, there are important limitations to consider.
For example, it remains an open question why we are so captivated by immoral others, and
whether there exists specific contexts and specific domains of transgressions that may moderate
or eliminate this interest. Below, we speculate on these caveats in more detail.
One possible explanation for the attraction to immoral others is simply a general
negativity bias (see Norris, 2021; Vaish et al., 2008). We are, in general, much more interested in
the bad than in the good. The standard evolutionary account is that the bad matters more than the
good; the cost of missing something dangerous in the environment, like a snake, is greater than
the cost of missing something positive, like sweet fruit. Only the first mistake can kill you. This
same logic applies to people. In a room with a homicidal killer and a kindly billionaire
philanthropist, the killer can do you more harm than the philanthropist can do you good. Immoral
others may exploit our negativity bias, reflecting a general (and highly adaptive) interest in what
can harm us in the real world.
Another explanation is that we are interested in bad characters because, at some level, we
wish to be them. This type of exploration appeals to mental simulation (Mar & Oatley, 2008)—
the process of immersing oneself in a fictional world. Simulation is a central topic in the
cognitive science of fiction, and it can be a profound experience. Simulation recruits the neural
machinery that supports social reasoning (Tamir et al., 2016), correlates with improved socialcognitive functioning (Dodell-Feder & Tamir, 2018), and it affords changes to how we see
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ourselves (Meyer et al., 2019; see also Cushman, 2020). When we simulate another person, we
can, for a short period of time, become more like them; our traits come to resemble theirs (Sestir
and Green, 2010). There may be circumstances when this is desirable (but see Gendler, 2000), or
personality traits like the Dark Triad (Greenwood et al., 2021; Jonason et al., 2012) and Morbid
Curiosity (Scrivner, 2021) that define who is the kind of person drawn in by this allure.
While the results of this series of experiments cannot sufficiently discriminate between
these two possible explanations or a Moral Worldbuilding framework, we argue that the more
likely cause of this attraction is an epistemic one. We simulate badness and engage with
ambiguous moral others as a way to explore the moral realm, to make sense of different ways of
seeing the world, and to better calibrate our moral cognition. Negativity bias and dispositional
differences also play some role, but they do not explain the whole picture. If it completely the
product of a negativity bias, rather than the information available, we should never see moral
“saints” elicit curiosity. But they do (at least some of the time). And while a desire to be like bad
guys may drive some people toward them (i.e., those high in Dark Triad traits), we do not
believe this accounts for the substantial documented interest in the minds of morally bad and
ambiguous people (e.g., Krause & Rucker, 2020).
Instead, we argue that the optimal interesting person is not the purely evil, but rather a
combination of normatively different or conflicted. Someone who is bad enough to be different
than normal, as is evidenced by moral badness eliciting curiosity across all the experiments. And
moral ambiguity sparks curiosity for the same reasons—it is a signal that we are encountering
something that doesn't fit our worldview. These prediction errors may function to “debug” one’s
belief structures by finding faulty assumptions (for a review, see Hurley et al., 2011). The
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curiosity for moral ambiguity and moral badness is triggered by a “debugging” of one’s moral
worldview to resolve contradictions, inconsistencies, and to explore what is unknown.
These criteria also help to explain why curiosity for exceptionally morally good others
emerged in two experiments. When morally good others seem different than average (e.g., all
actions categorized as good or exceptional relative to an average Joe), they should pique interest.
Under those circumstances, they offer information about our moral worlds (and also benefit from
being the socially desirable category). When they don’t seem exceptional, which they often do
not in real life (see McHugh et al., 2022) they are no longer interesting. Unlike moral ambiguity,
the norm space tightly defines whether morally good people are interesting or not. Moral
ambiguity and often moral badness trigger curiosity because they are necessarily aberrant,
conflicted, negative, and diagnostic of character.
These experiments have succeeded in demonstrating the persist curiosity directed at
moral badness and moral ambiguity (and not average morality). This pattern suggests that there
is something special about immorality and others’ moral mind that differ from average that
drives epistemic engagement. While not explored here, another reasonable prediction is that
there exists some boundary or domain for which curiosity for immorality is assuaged. Like the
morally good category, at some point morally bad is likely no longer interesting. Thus, the
asymmetry that we demonstrate here may be a product of not yet locating that boundary. For
example, gross bodily transgressions likely elicit sufficient disgust and withdrawal motivation to
push away most (though not those high in Morbid Curiosity). Future research should examine
what the boundaries of curiosity are for both moral ambiguity and moral badness.
We also found that the morally ambiguous targets were often seen as most difficult (i.e.,
cognitively challenging) to engage with. Indeed, research suggests that the process of blaming
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someone else requires more cognitive effort when it requires engagement with their mind
(Bambrah et al., 2022). Ambiguous targets require engagement because their moral status is
unclear—they are neither completely good nor completely bad. Future work should also examine
preferences for moral ambiguity with more naturalistic stimuli like videos, movie trailers, or
games.
Another important caveat to note is that we measured and included similarity as a covariate
across most of the experiments. We did this because a spate of literature suggests that
identification predicts enjoyment of entertainment characters—especially ambiguous ones (e.g.,
Eden et al., 2017; Greenwood, 2009; Krause & Rucker, 2020; Tsay & Kralowiak, 2011).
Borrowing from that literature, we explicitly asked participants to think about how similar they
felt they were to the moral target. However, as this literature notes, engagement with fictional
characters includes other aspects outside of similarity such as wishful identification and
parasocial interaction (Greenwood et al., 2021). Similarity may also refer to seeing oneself
mirrored in a given target, or feelings as though their actions, feelings, or motives reflect your
own (see also Carroll, 2008 for discussion on identification). Which kind of similarity people
have in mind when they identify with another mind may lead to different patterns of results and
should be explored in future research.
These results also do not provide evidence of one assumption of Moral Worldbuilding—
that it is in the service of psychological well-being. Looking to literature on similar phenomena
like morbid curiosity, there is some evidence that well-being is tied to these epistemic motives.
For example, research conducted on the COVID-19 pandemic suggests that people who
frequently watched horror movies were more likely to be resilient to lockdown and pandemicrelated psychological distress (Scrivner et al., 2021). The curiosity to engage with immoral and
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bad others may have similar benefits for psychological well-being. Future research should
explore this pattern within the context of moral curiosity, and test whether moral curiosity relates
to personality traits like neuroticism.
Lastly, it is also worth noting that the Moral Worldbuilding framework shares features
with another offered content-free model of morality: moral judgment as categorization (MJAC;
McHugh et al., 2022). We agree with the authors of that piece on several points; current theories
of moral judgment are lacking, they often require essentialist definitions to explain moral
concepts, and a type-token conceptualization of moral judgment is both useful and plausible.
Thus, the Moral Worldbuilding theory can be seen to build on this trend––extending work done
in other tangential fields (affective science in the case of this dissertation, cognitive in the case of
MJAC) to moral psychology in order to push the study of morality to a more domain general
space.
However, we would also like to note some key areas of distinction. First, this effort
concerns the drives relevant to morality broadly, rather than being concerned solely with the
process of moral judgment. Second, while we agree that categorization is a useful lens from
which to examine moral judgments and decision-making, we also believe, as the authors note,
that this misses a few nuanced points about morality. For example, the authors note that the
doctrine of double effect is not well predicted by MJAC unless you take it to be a form of moral
dumbfounding. However, this effect reflects a larger tendency in morality, and one which can be
explained without moral dumbfounding. That is, the harm caused by means compared to sideeffects represents learned causal reasoning judgments (e.g., causal sensitivity; Woodward, 2006;
Kominsky et al., 2015) and metalizing skills. We learn from our own actions and their
consequences, and as a result, make judgments about counterfactual possibilities (like in the law;

107
Byrne, 2016; Spellman & Kincannon, 2001) and the intentions of others (and do so in a valenceasymmetric way; Knobe, 2003; 2010; Leslie et al., 2006) based on that knowledge. For example,
when harmful side-effects are seen as obviously unpredictable outcomes, people don’t judge that
act to be intentional—reasoning about blame and intention shifts to match whether a harmful
side-effect could have been anticipated as such34 (Laurent et al., 2019). Similarly, when we
didn’t expect a good outcome in our daily lives, and had no desire to do good (i.e., are
completely surprised by it), we likely would be hesitant to take credit for that as being an
intended good side-effect. People learn how intentions and actions bear consequences in the real
world and use scaffold how we blame, praise, and make judgments about ourselves and others.
Altogether, MJAC and Moral Worldbuilding are largely complimentary frameworks, but Moral
Worldbuilding offers insight into a broader range of moral cognitive processes.
5.3 Other thoughts
Morality weaves together norms, emotions, and more. And as a result of that, it is a
powerful ingredient for developing and maintaining who you are and where you fit in the world.
The process orientation framework adopted by Moral Worldbuilding suggests that domain
general cognitive skills support and guide moral worldbuilding. We suggest that curiosity in the
moral domain drives epistemic functions relevant to the moral domain, and like we found in
Experiments 2 and 3, empathy-related skills play also play a large role in who finds morally
ambiguous and morally bad content interesting. This suggest that general processes related to
empathy, simulation, and other cognitive functions that support imagination are critical to moral
cognition and moral worldbuilding functions. And indeed, other research supports the centrality
of simulation and mentalizing functions to moral cognition. For example, research on the

34

In fact, when asked about whether a side-effect was intentional, people instead interpret the question to mean
something like: “Did the person know, when they acted, that the X would be harmed?” (Laurent et al., 2019).
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temporal parietal junction, a neural region critical to mentalizing, suggests that this region is
more activated during moral computations than nonmoral ones (Young & Saxe, 2009), and
disruption to this neural region affects moral judgments (Young et al., 2010; Jeurissen et al.,
2014). To better understand Moral Worldbuilding as a framework, future research should
examine how mentalizing supports what (and who) we are curious to learn more about.
Additionally, we found strong (correlational) evidence that individual differences help to
explain for whom morally ambiguous or bad content is most alluring. Moral Worldbuilding
theory suggests that each person’s understanding of the world should prompt exploration and
engagement in the service of upholding that worldview. We found that whether people were
dispositionally interested in morbid content, other people’s minds, or ambiguity in general, they
were also more driven to engage with moral information that upheld those views. In other words,
when people tend to like bad things, they also seek out and find more pleasure in engaging with
those bad things than people who don’t. We also found that those resistant to engaging with the
minds or content related to moral badness were the least curious to explore that content. This
again provides evidence for how you’ve learned to understand and make sense of your world
guiding the kind of content you are curious to learn more about. Notably, the Morbid Curiosity
scale was negatively associated with the Imaginative Resistance scale (p < 0.001) in our data
(Experiment 2 and 3). This again provides some evidence for the claim that the process of
engaging with immoral and bad others requires imagination and mentalizing. There are
interesting intersections with work on teleological explanations (e.g., Lewry et al., 2021). We
measured trait good/evil essentialism but did not find a reliable pattern of results. Future research
should investigate whether teleological explanations for goodness and badness of others’ minds
correlates with categorization (or condemnation) of others’ moral actions. What are lay intuitions
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about the purpose for why people are good or are bad? Do those intuitions differ for those who
are ambiguous? Future research should investigate these questions, exploring how the individual
differences that shape people’s intuitions about teleological explanations.
We saw that imaginative resistance and empathy both played a role in people’s
preferences and curiosity for moral content, but there may also be consequences of engaging
with immoral others. That is, moral curiosity drives us to explore immoral content, but the
present experiments did not explore whether this exploration leads to changes to the self,
perceptions about the world, or about others. Research suggests that simulation is powerful—it
can enhance empathy felt toward both in- and out-group members (Volberg et al., 2021).
Imagining the minds of extremely morally deviant others may lead to stable changes to the self
(as noted in section 5.2). While this is possible (and one of the posited causes of imaginative
resistance; Gendler, 2000), it is not likely. Research on aggression caused by video games
suggests that engaging video game play does not lead to changes in aggression, even though
when the video game content is directly related to aggression (Kühn et al., 2019). However, it is
also possible that imagining morally wrong behaviors may not influence the self because it is
obviously “make-believe” (Gendler, 2000), just as video games clearly are. As such, something
more immersive (e.g., virtual reality) may cause changes to the self, changes of which we are
generally fearful. This may be why there is generally an absence of rules that violate our moral
rules in fiction. Reading fiction can be extremely immersive and may lead to changes to both
how we see and understand our world and to ourselves.
While we only explored norms through the lens of average and ideal judgments, norms
also play a large role in defining who is bad, who is good, what actions are moral at all, and how
easy it is to engage with the minds of others. It is possible that by changing perceptions of how
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normative certain behaviors are, we can also change how curious people are to learn more about
them. That is, making someone’s moral actions seem non-normative may be a way to make a
boring moral saint someone who people are interested in learning more about and engaging with.
This is a potentially interesting avenue for exploring how to increase compliance with prosocial
actions or other behavior change.
There is also research that suggests gender may play a role in the kinds of moral content
people are drawn to. For example, one study found that females are on average more drawn to
stories about bad guys than males are (Vicary & Fraley, 2010). The authors of this study found
that fitness related information explained this attraction to morally bad stories—women, who
perceive themselves as more likely to be a victim of crime than mean (Allen, 2006; Franklin &
Franklin, 2009; Lorenc et al., 2012), are drawn to stories that offer relevant information about
their worlds. A worldview that you might be a victim of crime should make you curious to learn
more about the minds of those who enact crimes, how to avoid it, and more. And indeed, in
Experiments 1a, 2, and 3, we also find a significant gender difference in that direction. In
Experiment 1a, we found a statistically significant interaction between gender and Moral Status
Type on “Learn” deck selection, b = 0.64, SE = 0.20, z = 3.20, p = .001, r = 0.17. Women were
more likely to select the “Learn” deck for the bad moral targets compared to the ambiguous but
not for good compared to ambiguous. We did not find a similar effect in the pilot or Experiment
1b. In Experiment 2, there was another significant interaction between gender and moral target
selection such that female participants were more likely to report that high levels of curiosity for
bad, b = 0.23, SE = 0.11, p = .038, than men were. And in Experiment 3, we found that women
were overall more curious to learn about ambiguous others, b = 0.53, SE = 0.16, p = .001
compared to men. Altogether, we have mixed evidence that gender plays a large role in defining
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what kinds of minds of others we are interested in exploring. Future research should explore the
features of moral situations that are more likely to elicit curiosity for different gender identities.
Finally, this epistemic framework also provides a foundation for making predictions about
low level cognitive phenomena like the attentional capture of moral content (Brady, Gantman, et
al., 2020; Brady, Crockett, et al., 2020). Research suggests that moral content is more likely to
pop-out in visual experience (Gantman & Van Bavel, 2014; 2015), especially when moral
motives are activated and relevant (Gantman & Van Bavel, 2016; Whitman et al., 2018). This
pattern aligns well with predictions made form Moral Worldbuilding theory. Moral
Worldbuilding theory predicts that moral ambiguity and moral badness are specifically
prioritized on a visual level. Ambiguous people––people who are not easily categorized as good
or bad––constitute a quasi-motive because their status is unresolved. This motivational relevance
(i.e., unresolved categorization) should lead to prioritization in perceptual processing
(Ovsiankina, 1928). Similarly, evidence suggests that negative social information captures
attention (Anderson et al., 2011). As such, we would expect negative moral content to also
capture attention quickly and for curiosity to sustain it. Future research should test whether the
preference for morally ambiguous and morally bad content emerges on a lower level of
analysis—whether this information captures attention and is easier to perceive because we are
motivated to do so (see also Balcetis & Dunning, 2013; Leong et al., 2019; 2020).
5.4 Conclusion
Our daily experiences with morality, reflected in the entertainment we are drawn to,
illustrate the allure of moral information––and specifically the allure of morally ambiguous and
morally non-normative information. This framework clarifies disparate findings in moral
psychology, foregrounds the contextual nature of moral value, and highlights a key link between
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real-world preferences and functional approach to morality—moral curiosity promotes learning
and feelings of satisfaction.
This interdisciplinary research aimed to establish one of the antecedents to polarized
thinking and seeing by testing the interestingness of morality, and how it affects how we engage
with moral content. It sought to re-envision moral cognition with the starting point of everyday
fascination with moral ambiguity and moral badness. People say they condemn moral ambiguity
but are eager to watch and learn more about antiheroes (and villains) compared to heroes.
Understanding how individuals construct and maintain their moral worldview can help us
understand how people come to have the clashing worldviews that often lead to political divides.
This is a first step in scaffolding these seemingly inconvertible thoughts to bridge divides.
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Appendix A
Experimental Stimuli
Pilot Experiment Names
1. Tony Soprano
2. Dexter Morgan
3. Wolverine
4. Don Draper
5. Snape
6. Han Solo
7. Jamie Lannister
8. The Punisher
9. Deadpool
10. Walter White
Experiment 1a-1b Names
1. James Smith
2. John Williams
3. Robert Johnson
4. Michael Jones
5. William Brown
6. David Miller
7. Richard Davis
8. Charles Wilson
9. Joseph Moore
10. Thomas Taylor

11. Superman
12. Captain America
13. Spiderman
14. Gandalf the Grey
15. Rocky Balboa
16. Thor
17. Indiana Jones
18. Obi-wan Kenobi
19. Jon Snow
20. Frodo Baggins

21. The Joker
22. Lex Luthor
23. Hannibal Lecter
24. Voldemort
25. Bane
26. Norman Bates
27. Petyr Baelish
28. Thanos
29. The Night King
30. Darth Vader

11. Christopher
Anderson
12. Daniel Thomas
13. Paul Jackson
14. Mark White
15. Donald Harris
16. George Martin
17. Kenneth Thompson
18. Steven Garcia
19. Edward Martinez
20. Brian Robinson

21. Ronald Clark
22. Anthony Rodriguez
23. Kevin Lewis
24. Jason Lee
25. Matthew Walker
26. Gary Hall
27. Jeff Allen
28. Jose Young
29. Larry Wright
30. Geoffrey King

Complete set of stimuli available on the project’s OSF page: https://osf.io/7av2b/
CDF Images
Experiments 1a and 1b
WM-257, WM-251, WM-247, WM-243, WM-241, WM-238, WM-235, WM-233, WM-231,
WM-229, WM-227, WM-223, WM-220, WM-218, WM-214, WM-211, WM-209, WM-205,
WM-200, WM-038, WM-033, WM-028, WM-024, WM-021, WM-020, WM-018, WM-011,
WM-006, WM-003
Experiment 2 [Bold indicates old face, and italicized indicates new face]
WM-245, WM-240, WM-200, WM-024, WM-015, WM-003, WM-229, WM-220, WM-205,
WM-033, WM-216, WM-214, WM-227, WM-021, WM-006, WM-014, WM-203, WM-209, WM211, WM-253
- Meanage = 26.6, 27.1; Meanattractive = 3.2, 3.3; Meandominance =3.0, 3.0
Example Stimuli
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Deck task Example

Figure S1. Example of the deck task adapted form Cameron et al. (2019).
Experiment 1a
Describe:

Learn:
Morally ambiguous: Paid for a taxi to take
an intoxicated man to his residence. Stole a
colleague’s ideas and presented them as
their own.
Morally good: Gave food to the needy
Morally bad: Hit a car and left the scene of
the accident.

Figure S2. Example “Describe” image.
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Experiment 1b
Describe: Same as Experiment 1a.
Learn:
Morally ambiguous: This person only ever has good intentions. However, their passionate nature
can get in the way and they sometimes cause trouble without wanting to do so nor by realizing it
entirely.
Morally good: This person is committed to guiding and training the younger generation. This
person is very wise and honorable, and is always willing to provide others with valuable life
advice. They feel happiest when people they have helped go on to succeed in life.
Morally bad: This person is a bully. They humiliate and put others down. They often point
fingers and laugh at others, especially when they are with their friends so the other person feels
outnumbered and alone.
Experiment 2
Table S1. Example of stimuli revealed for each Moral Status Type in Experiment 2.
Morally Ambiguous

Morally Bad

Morally Good

Morally Average

Experiment 3
Table S2. Example of stimuli revealed for each ambiguous type in Experiment 3.
Aesthetic Ambiguity
This person's work is known to be pleasant
but also derivative. The artist uses color and
shapes in a way that is visually appealing but
that also closely resembles the work of other
painters. There is a beauty to his work, but it
does not look wholly original. Most typical
art observers think this work is nice, but
critics find the work unimaginative.

Question wording
Experiment 1a

Moral Ambiguity
This person often engages in foolish and
playful behavior that may bring about chaos.
However, he met a new group of friends that
motivates him to do better and pulls him away
from engaging in this kind of behavior. But
he still enjoys being foolish and is foolish
often. He is driven by his selfish impulses but
is learning to control them.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Please write 2 keywords describing the morality of this person.
How interesting do you find this person?
Do you feel this person is like you?
How morally good is this person?
How morally bad is this person?

Experiment 1b
Trial level:
1. Do you feel this person is like you?
2. How morally good is this person?
3. How morally bad is this person?
Participant level:
1. When you chose the DESCRIBE deck, to what extent did you think you would learn
something narrow (only applies to this person) vs. broad (might apply to more people)?
2. When you chose the LEARN deck, to what extent did you think you would learn
something narrow (only applies to this person) vs. broad (might apply to more people)?
3. Which deck did you find more difficult to write keywords for?
4. Which deck did you find more fun?
Experiment 2
Trial level:
Phase two
1. If you had to guess what this person was like, how confident would you be in that guess?
2. How curious are you to know more about this person?
3. How interesting do you think this person would be?
4. How similar to you do you think this person is?
5. How much do you expect to learn about human nature from this person?
Phase three
1. How average is this person?
2. How ideal is this person?
3. How satisfying do you find the information you learned about this person?
4. To what extent is the information you learned useful to you in the future?
5. Do you think the information you learned helps reveal a genuine pattern, structure, or
regularity about humanity?
6. Do you think the information you learned is narrow (only applies to the person you
learned about) or broad (also applies to people in general)?
Participant level:
1. “When you chose the [LEARN/DESCRIBE] deck, to what extent did you think you
would learn something narrow (only applies to this person) vs. broad (might apply to
more people)?”
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2. “When you chose the [LEARN/DESCRIBE] deck, to what extent did you think you
would learn something that reveals a genuine pattern, structure, or regularity about?”,
3. “When you chose the [LEARN/DESCRIBE] deck, to what extent did you think you
would learn something about human nature (even if you already have a good idea about
human nature)?”
4. In general, why did you select one person over the other three?
5. Which kind of person was most fascinating to learn about?
6. Which kind of person was easiest (took least mental or emotional effort) to learn about?
7. To what extent were you trying to show that you had good ethics and values on the
decision task (4 option decision) you just completed?
8. To what degree did you believe that the decision task you just completed was a measure
of moral character and values?
9. To what extent does moral character involve feeling empathy for other people?
Individual Differences Measures
Morbid Curiosity [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree] [Experiments 1 – 3]
1. I am curious about crime and enjoy reading detailed news accounts about murders and
other violent crimes.
2. I would be interested in watching a documentary on motives behind real murders.
3. My favorite part of a crime show is learning about why the killer did what he did.
4. I would be interested in watching an interview with an imprisoned serial killer talking
about his crimes.
5. Being a criminal profiler who studies the personality of murderers would be an
interesting job.
6. I am curious about the minds of violent people.
Evil essentialism [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree] [Experiments 1a – 1b]
1. Differences between good and evil people's personalities are in their DNA.
2. Differences between good and evil people are fixed at birth.
3. Differences between good and evil people are primarily determined by biology.
4. Good and evil people have different personality types.
5. The underlying nature of evil people makes it difficult them to learn to behave more like
good people.
6. Good people are naturally less aggressive than evil people.
Single-item Need for Consistency [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]
1. I make an effort to appear consistent to others.
Need for Cognition [Extremely uncharacteristic of me to Extremely characteristic of me]
[Experiments 1 – 3] (italicized items are from the short version)
1. I prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to
challenge my thinking abilities.
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5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance, I will have to think
in depth about something.
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.
8. I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones.
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat
important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental
effort.
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
Imaginative resistance [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]
1. Being asked to imagine morally repugnant things makes me uncomfortable.
2. I usually avoid books that have the good guys acting in ways that are morally
unacceptable.
3. I would be uncomfortable reading a book in which the protagonist thought it was okay to
kill people.
Perspective-taking empathy [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]
1. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.
2. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective.
Belief in a Just World [Strongly disagree to Strongly agree]
1. I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me.
2. I am usually treated fairly.
3. I believe that I usually get what I deserve.
4. Overall, events in my life are just.
5. In my life injustice is the exception rather than the rule.
6. I believe that most of the things that happen in my life are fair.
7. I think that important decisions that are made concerning me are usually just.
8. I think basically the world is a just place.
9. I believe that, by and large, people get what they deserve.
10. I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice.
11. I am convinced that in the long run people will be compensated for injustices.
12. I firmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politics) are
the exception rather than the rule.
13. I think people try to be fair when making important decisions.
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Appendix B
Pilot Experiment S1
We conducted a small pilot experiment to examine whether selection of the “Learn” deck
was associated with curiosity.
Method
Design
We used the same basic design as in Experiment 1a and 1b. A fully within-subjects
design with 3 levels for Moral Status Type (morally good, bad, and ambiguous) was be used.
Participants
We recruited a total of 26 participants from Prolific. We conducted analyses on a final
sample of 20 participants who passed attention and manipulation comprehension items. The
same inclusion criteria from Experiment 1a was used. Prolific participants were paid $2.67 on
average for their participation.
Deck Decision Task
The same deck decision task from the Experiment 1b. After seeing the moral status
manipulation, participants selected either the “Describe” or “Learn” deck.
Moral Status Type Stimuli
The same thirty stimuli from Experiment 1b were used.
Self-reported curiosity
Participants were asked “How curious are you about this person?” on a participant level for
a single representative person from each of the three categories, rated on a scale from 1 = Not at
all curious to 9 = Extremely curious.
Other ratings
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Participants were asked the same identification, goodness, badness, and interest questions
as in Experiment 1b.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1b with one exception. Participants rated how
curious they were about the moral target and then made their decision for which deck they
preferred. After completing the experiment, all participants were debriefed.
Results
We specified random intercepts for participants and curiosity as the predictor to test
whether curiosity predicted binary deck decision. Results yielded a significant effect: the more
curiosity participants reported, the more likely they were to select the “Learn” deck, b = 0.18, SE
= 0.06, z = 2.91, p = .004, r = 0.05, 95% CI [0.06, 0.31] (see Figure S1). This effect remained
robust when including self-identification as a covariate (b = 0.17, SE = 0.06, z = 2.75, p = .006, r
= 0.05).

Figure S3. Curiosity predicts probability of choosing the "Learn" deck. Shading represents 95%
Confidence Intervals.
Interest was also a significant predictor of “Learn” deck selection, b = 0.45, SE = 0.08, z
= 5.96, p < .001, r = 0.12. We also explored whether interest mediated the relationship between
curiosity and “Learn” deck selection. The indirect effect was tested using a percentile bootstrap
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estimation approach with 500 samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). These results did indicate that
the indirect coefficient was significant, b = .03, 95% CI [0.02, 0.04], p < 0.001, and the average
direct effect was not significant, b = .02, 95% CI [-0.005, 0.04], p = 0.14, suggesting full
mediation. Though these results should be interpreted with caution given the small sample size.
Discussion
Overall, we found evidence that curiosity is associated with greater selection of the
“Learn” deck relative to the “Describe” deck. This provides evidence that our operationalization
of curiosity for explanations is appropriate.
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Appendix C
Supplemental Experiment S2
People often engage with moral content in fictional worlds and may feel freer to act on
this curiosity in fiction than in real life (see Wylie et al., 2022). To better understand what kind
of moral content is engaging for people, we collated data from Netflix’s publicly available, most
viewed TV shows and movies and had an independent sample of participants rate the morality of
the main characters, their interest in the show, their identification with the character, and their
experience of effort in watching. We first preregistered looking at the proportion of these most
popular shows/movies categorized as having an immoral compared to moral main character.
Next, we tested for relationships between moral character judgments, effort, learning,
identification, and hours watched for each of the shows/movies. This allowed us to explore the
kinds of content that draw people in to engage in real life—with a real-life measure, hours spent
watching.
Results
We investigated whether a larger proportion of these top shows/movies in the United
States were categorized as having an immoral rather than morally good main character. 15% of
these popular shows are aimed at children (e.g., Cocomelon). As pre-registered, when we
consider only programming for adults, we find that 59% of the most popular shows and movies
over a five-month period (starting from when Netflix began to release the data) were rated as
having an immoral main character, compared to 41% having a morally good main character,
which were statistically different from one another (χ2 (1, N = 2,493) = 79.43, p < 0.001).
We next used correlational analyses to investigate the relationship between hours viewed
and the series of ratings. We found statistically significant correlations among all variables with
the exception of perceived effort of viewing and self-identification with the main character,
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r(3421) = 0.01, p = 0.511. Critically, there was a significant negative correlation between moral
character (where the scale goes from immoral to morally good) and total hours viewed, r(3408) =
-0.13, 95% CI [-0.16, -0.10], p < .001. There was also a small but significant relationship
between effort and morality such that more effort was associated with more immoral characters,
r(3408) = –0.07, 95% CI [-0.10, -0.04], p < .001. Finally, learning was positively related to
moral character rating, r(3408) = 0.19, 95% CI [0.16, 0.22], p = .013. Moral learning as higher
when the protagonist was morally good. We report the full correlation matrix in Table S3.
Table S3. Correlation matrix for the participant ratings and total hours viewed.
Measure
1. Self-identification
2. Effort
3. Learning
4. Morality
5. Hours viewed

1
--.01
.39***
.50***
-.04*

2

3

4

5

-.11***
-.07***
.09***

-.19***
.05*

--.13***

--

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Holm method for p-value adjustment.
Discussion
We found evidence that immorality often triumphs in entertainment. A larger proportion
of the top 10 Netflix TV shows and movies made for adults over a five-month period from
November 2021 to March 2022 contained an immoral main character. In support of this, we also
found that the more immoral the main character of the show, the more total hours were viewed.
Effort and moral character were also negatively correlated; main characters that are immoral may
make programs more effortful to engage with, yet people choose to watch them despite the extra
work they require. This study provides preliminary evidence that there is a link between
immorality and engagement—one that emerges even though immoral characters are more
effortful to watch.
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Appendix D
Supplemental Analyses
Pilot Experiment
We report the descriptive statistics for the target variables in the pilot experiment in Table
S4.
Table S4. Dependent variables descriptive statistics for the pilot experiment
Measure

N

Mean

415

0.36 [0.27, 0.47]

Moral badness

415

4.68

2.05

Moral goodness

415

5.34

1.96

Self-reported interest

415

6.59

2.16

Deck Decision

403

0.29 [0.21, 0.38]

Moral badness

403

2.53

1.61

Moral goodness

403

7.44

1.47

Self-reported interest

403

6.95

2.01

Deck Decision

422

0.37 [0.27, 0.47]

Moral badness

422

7.17

1.95

Moral goodness

422

2.83

1.94

Ambiguous Target
Deck Decision

SD

Good Target

Bad Target

Self-reported interest
422
6.27
Note. For the Deck decision, 0 = Describe and 1 = Learn.

2.31

Experiment 1a
We report the descriptive statistics for the target variables Experiment1a in Table S4. We
also report correlations among individual differences in Figure S5. Most notably, participants
high in Need for Cognition were low in Essentialism of Evil, but those high in Essentialism of
Evil were also high in Morbid Curiosity.
Table S5. Dependent variables descriptive statistics for the Experiment 1a.
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Measure

Mean

SD

Ambiguous Target
Deck Decision

0.53 [0.48, 0.58]*

Moral badness

4.80

1.62

Moral goodness

4.86

1.57

Self-identification

3.10

1.98

Self-reported interest

4.33

2.20

Good Target
Deck Decision

0.43 [0.38, 0.47]*

Moral badness

3.25

1.59

Moral goodness

6.34

1.68

Self-identification

4.74

2.29

Self-reported interest

4.95

2.17

Bad Target
Deck Decision

0.68 [0.64, 0.73]*

Moral badness

6.02

1.97

Moral goodness

3.46

1.82

Self-identification

2.30

1.73

Self-reported interest

3.62

2.15

Note. For the Deck decision, 1 = Describe and 2 = Learn. *: These are predicted probabilities for
the model specification described in the results of Experiment 1a.
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Figure S4. Correlations among individual differences measures. P-values use a Holm
Correction for multiple testing. ***p < 0.001, *p = 0.05.
Experiment 1b
We report the descriptive statistics for the target variables Experiment1b in Table S6,
Table S7, and Table S8. We also report correlations among individual differences in Figure S5.
Table S6. Descriptive statistics for target variable in Experiment 1b.
Measure
Ambiguous Targets
Deck Decision
Good Targets
Deck Decision
Bad Targets
Deck Decision

Mean

SD

0.47

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.51

0.50

Note. For the Deck decision, 0 = Describe and 1 = Learn.
Table S7. Descriptive statistics for the Participant-level variables in Experiment 1b.
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Measure
Ambiguous Targets
Average
Self-reported curiosity
Worldview fit
Ideal
Self-reported identity
Ease of Imagining a world without
Bad Targets
Average
Self-reported curiosity
Worldview fit
Ideal
Self-reported identity
Ease of Imagining a world without
Good Targets
Average
Self-reported curiosity
Worldview fit
Ideal
Self-reported identity
Ease of Imagining a world without

Mean

SD

6.96
5.61
5.18
4.60
5.53
4.09

1.90
2.42
1.46
1.93
2.12
2.29

3.25
6.37
3.22
1.60
2.38
3.79

2.03
2.60
1.71
1.36
1.58
2.12

4.12
6.88
4.22
7.30
5.59
3.59

2.24
2.09
1.79
2.06
1.88
2.22

Figure S5. Correlations among Participant-level individual differences.
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Table S8. Differences in perceived learning for the two decks.
Measure
“Describe” Deck
Utility of Learning
Learn Pattern
Broad Learning
“Learn” Deck
Utility of Learning
Learn Pattern
Broad Learning

Mean

SD

4.26
3.44
3.16

3.05
2.53
2.40

4.84
6.09
6.05

2.64
1.98
2.02

Participant-level curiosity judgments
We also ran an additional analysis where we calculated a mean for the deck decision and
then tested whether curiosity for the individual Moral Status Types predicted average deck
choice. Overall, we found that curiosity judgments for ambiguous and not good or bad targets
(p’s > .2) predicts average deck decision, b = 0.01, SE = 0.005, t(243) = 2.21, p = .028, r = 0.14.
Experiment 2
Phase one decision additional analysis
To better understand what decisions participants were most likely to make, we ran
additional binomial test with Phase one decisions. We tested whether the observed probability
was statistically distinguishable from chance (see Table S9). Results suggested that both the
Good and Bad moral status types were selected more frequently than would be expected by
chance alone, p’s < 0.001. This pattern of results is graphically depicted in Figure S6.
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Table S9. Binomial Test for the Phase 1 Decision.
95% CI for Proportion
Variable
Level
Counts Total Proportion
p
Lower
Upper
Decision Average
520 3050
0.170 1.000
0.159
1.000
Good
906 3050
0.297 < .001
0.283
1.000
Bad
917 3050
0.301 < .001
0.287
1.000
Ambiguous
707 3050
0.232 0.991
0.219
1.000
Note. For all tests, the alternative hypothesis specifies that the proportion is greater than 0.25.

Figure S6. Comparison of each moral status type decision to chance. Only the Good and Bad
moral status types were selected more frequently than chance.
Model comparisons
We conducted model comparisons for each dependent variable to determine whether to
include random slopes for participants. Overall, model fit suggested that including random slopes
significantly improved fit relative to the intercepts only model. In Table S10, we report the AIC
for the selected (random slopes and intercepts) model as well as the chi-square change value and
its p-value.
Table S10. Comparison of model fits for dependent variables in Experiment 2.

Measure
1. Curiosity
2. Confidence
3. Interest

Selected
model AIC
8622.1
9264
8887.5

χ2

p-value

288.15
267.57
507.05

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
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4. Expected Learning
5. Satisfaction
6. Average
7. Ideal
8. Utility of learning
9. Recognition of pattern
10. Broadness of applicability

9105.7
10610
9757.4
9018.2
9988.4
10083
10608

174.79
243.02
188.25
151.66
113.24
242.81
163.74

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

Additional moderators
We report patterns of results only for a subset of the moderators in the main text. As
such, we report additional collected moderators here. Overall, patterns were similar across
additional moderators such that significant interactions were ordinal. All models reported below
include a moderator, phase one target selection, and their interaction term as predictors of
curiosity. Random intercepts and slopes are included.
Belief in a Just World. There was a marginal main effect of belief in a Just World on
curiosity, b = 0.18, SE = 0.09, t(280) = 1.98, p = .049, r = 0.12 (see Figure S7). The interaction
terms were not significant. Relative to the average moral status target, only morally ambiguous
approach approached significance, b = −0.16, SE = 0.09, t(268) = −1.83, p = .068, r = 0.11.
People high in belief in a just world were slightly less curious about ambiguous targets,
potentially avoiding the non-worldview confirming information.
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Figure S7. Individual differences in Belief in a Just World predicting curiosity for each of the
phase one moral status type decisions. Shading represents 95% Confidence Intervals.
Perspective taking. Perspective taking was a significant predictor of curiosity, b = 0.28,
SE = 0.05, t(274) = 5.57, p < .001, r = 0.32 (see Figure S9). Additionally, relative to morally
average targets, the interaction between perspective-taking and morally ambiguous, morally
good, and morally bad were all statistically significant (ambiguous: b = −0.18, SE = 0.05, t(260)
= −3.50, p < .001, r = 0.21; bad: b = −0.11, SE = 0.05, t(259) = −2.09, p = .038, r = 0.13; good: b
= −0.09, SE = 0.04, t(244) = −2.27, p = .024, r = 0.14). For those high in perspective-taking,
curiosity was highest for the non-average targets.
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Figure S7. Individual differences in Perspective-taking predicting curiosity for each of the phase
one moral status type decisions. Shading represents 95% Confidence Intervals.

Morbid curiosity. For morbid curiosity, we again saw that the individual difference
predicted more curiosity, b = 0.18, SE = 0.06, t(600) = 3.04, p = .003, r = 0.12 (see Figure S10).
There was also a significant interaction between morbid curiosity and the morally bad target
relative to morally average, b = 0.13, SE = 0.05, t(2762) = 2.82, p = .005, r = 0.05. Morally bad
targets were most interesting to those high in morbid curiosity.
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Figure S8. Individual differences in Morbid Curiosity predicting curiosity for each of the phase
one moral status type decisions. Shading represents 95% Confidence Intervals.
Need for Cognition. NFC was also associated with increases in curiosity, b = 0.22, SE =
0.07, t(621) = 2.95, p = .003, r = 0.12. We did not find any significant interactions, suggesting
that need for cognition contributes to general curiosity for more information, rather than specific
worldview related information.
Exploratory items
We also included three additional exploratory items to better understand the motives that
might interact with curiosity in the experimental setting. We asked participants three questions
adapted from Ferguson et al. (2020). We asked, “To what extent were you trying to show that
you had good ethics and values on the decision task (4 option decision) you just completed?”
(Self-presentation), “To what degree did you believe that the decision task you just completed
was a measure of moral character and values?” (Self-evaluation), and “To what extent does
moral character involve feeling empathy for other people?” (Skill-evaluation). Each item was
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rated on a 7-point scale. For the following items, we use linear mixed-effects models that specify
random-intercepts for participant.
Curiosity. The self-presentation and the skill-evaluation items predicted curiosity. People
who used their task decisions to illustrate their own moral values reported greater curiosity, b =
0.06, SE = 0.03, t(303) = 2.06, p = .040, r = 0.12. Similarly, those who believed the task required
empathy also reported more curiosity, b = 0.16, SE = 0.05, t(303) = 3.38, p < .001, r = 0.19. The
self-evaluation item did not predict curiosity, p = .503.
Perceived Learning. We also examined how these items predicted perceptions of
learning. We found that both self-items predicted greater perceptions of utility of learning.
People who reported that task decisions show their own moral values reported greater learning
utility, b = 0.19, SE = 0.04, t(303) = 4.85, p < .001, r = 0.27. Similarly, those who felt that the
task measured their own morals also reported greater learning utility, b = 0.16, SE = 0.04, t(303)
= 4.06, p < .001, r = 0.23. There was no relationship between task empathy and learning utility, p
= .183.
For the learning about patterns questions, results mirrored the learning utility item
relationships. People who reported that task decisions show their moral values reported learning
more about a genuine pattern, b = 0.10, SE = 0.03, t(303) = 3.84, p < .001, r = 0.22. Similarly,
those who felt that the task measured their own morals also reported learning more about a
genuine pattern, b = 0.09, SE = 0.03, t(303) = 3.07, p = .002, r = 0.17. There was no relationship
between task empathy and pattern learning, p = .300.
Lastly, we investigated the broadness of applicability item. For this item, only the selfpresentation item was a significant predictor, b = 0.09, SE = 0.03, t(303) = 3.60, p < .001, r =
0.20. The two others were not statistically significant, p’s > .29.
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Overall, we found that how participants approached the task had an influence on their
curiosity and learning. This was especially true for the perceived utility of learning—those who
felt the task was related to real life morality reported more perceived learning than those who did
not.
Experiment 3
We also compared model fits in Experiment two. Again, we compared models that
included random slopes for participants to models with just random intercepts. Like in
Experiment 2, model fit suggested that including random slopes significantly improved fit
relative to the intercepts only model (see Table S10).
Table S3. Comparison of model fits for dependent variables in Experiment 3.
Measure
1. Curiosity
2. Interest
3. Satisfaction
4. Average
5. Ideal
6. Utility of learning
7. Recognition of pattern
8. Broadness of applicability

Selected
model AIC
12722
12756
13056
12670
12731
12174
12982
13574

χ2

p-value

27.57
54.29
80.81
39.59
101.29
110.72
142.68
205.3

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

Additional Moderator
Morbid Curiosity. We again reported only a subset of the moderators in the main text.
Here, we report findings associated with morbid curiosity. We include the moderator, phase one
target selection, and their interaction term as predictors of curiosity. Random intercepts and
slopes are included. When morbid curiosity is included the marginal main effect of phase one
decision is no longer significant, p = .383. Morbid curiosity is itself a significant predictor of
curiosity, b = 0.23, SE = 0.08, t(383) = 2.86, p = .004, r = 0.14. This effect is qualified by a
statistically significant interaction, b = 0.17, SE = 0.05, t(356) = 3.66, p < .001, r = 0.19. As
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expected, people high in morbid curiosity are more curious about the morally ambiguous
compared to aesthetically ambiguous targets.
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